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DEPORTATIONS, REMOVALS AND THE 1996 IMMIGRATION ACTS:
A MODERN LOOK AT THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
by Lupe S. Salinas*
“There are those that look at things the way they are, and ask why?  I dream of things that 
never were, and ask why not.”--Robert F. Kennedy** 
I. Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court should extend the Ex Post Facto Clause1 to conviction-
related deportation/removal proceedings.2  In many respects, deportation can be viewed as a 
punishment that is more severe than confinement since removal from home, family, and country can 
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1U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, cl.3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”) & 
Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall ...pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . .”).
2The power for the Supreme Court to undertake judicial review was established quite early in 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (Chief Justice Marshall announced the 
concept of judicial review, stating that a statute in conflict with the Constitution is repugnant to 
the fundamental law and therefore void ).
mean permanent exile,3 in some cases to a country the deportee may have never actually known.4
As to the effects of deportation, Justice Brandeis stated in 1919:   “To deport one who so claims to 
be a citizen, obviously deprives him of liberty. . . .     It may result also in loss of both property and 
life; or of all that makes life worth living.  Against the danger of such deprivation, without the 
sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the Fifth Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of 
due process of law.”5  That same due process protection is similarly afforded by our Constitution to 
permanent resident aliens.6
Our famous Constitution has room to grow, to develop into a document that is consistent in 
all respects.  The Fourth Amendment refers to freedom from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”7
 Yet hundreds of American residents entered the new millennium in immigration custody, facing 
banishment from the United States and detachment from their families.  Permanent resident aliens 
across America committed crimes and served their sentences well before the effective date of the 
extremely castigating 1996 legislation of the Newt Gingrich-inspired so-called “Contract With 
America.”  As a result of these extreme legislative actions, the INS and civil rights groups have 
urged Congress to enact legislation to restore discretion in federal judges in deportation matters and 
to provide immigrants with due process protections.8
The United States Supreme Court, in its service as the third branch of government, 
3William R. Maynard, An Immigration Law Primer for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, VOICE 27 
(April 1999) [hereinafter Maynard].
4E.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) (deported alien had been in the United States since 
the age of three).  Removing criminals from our nation serves a valid purpose; however, removal 
regardless of the equities involved seems arbitrary, particularly considering that American 
immigration policy places a high priority on family reunification in admissions.  J. Joseph Reina, 
Understanding Family-Based Immigration, State Bar of Texas 2003 Immigration Law Course, 
Ch. 5.1 (2003).
5Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922).
6See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
7U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8Steve Lash, Deportation power changes are pushed, HOUS. CHRON., July 29, 1999, at A9.
interpreted part of the congressional legislation and ruled during the 2000 term that, absent clear 
contrary congressional directive, aliens have a right to a federal court habeas corpus hearing.9  In 
addition, the Court concluded that an alien retained certain statutory privileges under the 
immigration laws since nothing in the 1996 immigration legislation indicated that the repeal of the 
privilege of discretionary relief from deportation applied retroactively.10  More recently, the Court 
ruled in Stogner v. California11 that certain enactments violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  The writer will establish that Stogner strongly supports voiding the retroactive applications 
of the aggravated felony concept of the 1996 Immigration Acts. 
Court rulings that deportation is a civil proceeding, and thus not impacted by the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, reminded the writer of a conflict he experienced in 1975 when he served as a rookie 
prosecutor in the Harris County District Attorney’s Office in Houston, Texas.  As a juvenile court 
prosecutor, the writer’s duties included the termination of parental rights in cases involving child 
abuse. Texas procedural law classifies a parental termination proceeding as civil in nature.12
However, the result could punish the accused mother and/or father who brought the youth into the 
world by removing the child from his parent’s custody and supervision. Thus, in many respects, a 
termination of parental rights penalizes a parent worse than depriving them of their liberty.  The 
consequence is magnified if the termination of their rights occurred under circumstances that raise 
serious due process questions, such as not having an attorney to defend them because of their 
indigent status.13
9See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 (2001); see U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9 (2) (“The 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion 
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
10See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); see Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) and Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
11539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).
12See TEX. R. CIV. P. 308a (1990) (pertaining to suits affecting the parent-child relationship).
13See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.013 (a)(1) (2003) (The court shall appoint an attorney ad litem 
to represent the interests of an indigent parent who opposes termination of the parent-child 
This writer accomplished such a termination in one particular case where the defendant 
parents, because of their poverty, could not hire a lawyer.  The writer, then a father of two toddlers, 
empathized with the defendants.  What would have happened if an experienced lawyer had spoken 
on their behalf?  The writer’s supervising prosecutors could have accepted an alternative, such as 
supervised visitation until the parents completed anger management and child-rearing counseling.  A
clearly adversarial proceeding probably would have aided the parents, increasing the chances that 
their momentarily excessive discipline would not result in a permanent punishment.  However, their 
poverty prevented any meaningful access to the courts.  They faced the State of Texas without the 
aid of a lawyer.
Since parental termination litigation is classified as a civil proceeding, the law in 1975 Texas 
did not provide for court-appointed counsel to assist the indigent parents.  The court battle placed a 
lawyer against two frightened civilians. The father honestly explained his disciplinary methods, at all 
times sincerely asserting the “best interest of the child.”  The mother, apparently petrified at the 
thought of losing her child, sat mute throughout the trial. The writer anguished over the court’s 
decision, concluding that he had inflicted the worst punishment possible on this accused couple: the 
life sentence of the loss of their baby.14  The writer also then expressed the hope that some day our 
nation’s High Court would provide indigents accused of parental neglect or abuse in a civil parental 
termination hearing with court-appointed counsel since termination is punitive.  A few years later, 
the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Legislature fulfilled that prayer.15
This article seeks to explain how certain retroactive statutes, albeit civil in nature, can have 
relationship).
14The father spanked the child for playing with a can of paint.  The mother, even though she did 
not aid or participate in the corporal punishment, met the same penalty. 
15See generally Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U. S. 18 (1981), following Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)  (the right to court-appointed counsel depends upon the 
dictates of “fundamental fairness” on a case-by-case basis); TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.013 (a)(1) 
(2003) (providing for the appointment of attorney for indigent parents in termination 
proceedings).
such punitive consequences that they should be constitutionally prohibited. The 1996 IIRIRA 
legislation,16 which replaced the term “deportation” with the concept known as “removal,”
represents one of those statutes that, in specific circumstances, impacts not only retroactively but 
also punitively.17 The writer further contends that removal, when specifically conditioned upon a 
prior conviction, results in a loss of liberty that triggers not only due process protections but also ex 
post facto prohibitions.18 In signing one of the 1996 Immigration Acts into law, President Bill 
Clinton noted the inherent unfairness in fighting terrorism by including regular hard-working 
immigrants: “This bill also makes a number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws 
having nothing to do with fighting terrorism.  These provisions eliminate most remedial relief for 
long-term legal residents. . . .”19
Finally, the paper addresses much needed reforms involving the 1996 Immigration Acts. A 
number of scholars, civil rights leaders, INS officials and jurists have expressed concerns about the 
regressive and punitive impact of the 1996 legislation,20 a situation further aggravated by the attack 
16Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. at 3009-540 through 3009-724 (1996), codified as 8 U.S.C. § 
1101 et seq.(West 2000) [hereinafter 1996 Immigration Acts].
17See 8 U.S.C.  1227 (a)(2)(A) (iii) and § 1101 (a)(43) (A)-(U) (1999) (definition and 
descriptions of aggravated felonies).
18This article does not address the constitutionality of removals occasioned upon conduct not 
resulting in a conviction.  8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a) refers to non-conviction criminal-conduct grounds 
for removal.  Included in this category are alien smuggling, marriage fraud, false citizenship 
claim, national security violations, and drug abuse and addiction.
19Statement by President William Jefferson Clinton Upon Signing S. 735 [The Antiterrorism & 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996], 142 CONG. REC. 961-3, 110 Stat. 3009-749 (1996).
20See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the 
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000); Nancy Morawetz, 
Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 
(1998); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary 
Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 15 (2003).  The 
writer prefers classification not as an immigration scholar but as a criminal law and procedure 
scholar on the strength of his judicial and prosecutorial experience.  See also Steve Lash, 
Deportation power changes are pushed, HOUS. CHRON., July 29, 1999, at A9.
on the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001.21 For example, Anthony Lewis, a 
prominent columnist for the New York Times, called for reform, referring to the anti-immigrant 
zealotry and the need to return to the concepts of American decency.22 Other scholars have argued 
that the 1996 Immigration Acts, particularly the aggravated felony provision, violate international 
law.23 Jurists have also noted the plethora of cases generated by this highly controversial 
legislation.24
II. Concerns Over the Immigration Acts in the American Immigrant Community
Simon Wiesenthal, a victim of Nazi atrocities, and later active in the effort to hunt war 
criminals and bring them to justice, once rationalized his zeal by warning that people should always 
be cognizant of history to avoid its negative repetition.25  Our American history has unfortunately 
been replete with such examples of racial and ethnic injustice, such as the days of slavery, the frauds 
perpetrated on Native Americans, the passage of legislation to exclude Chinese immigrants, the 
21See Edward Hegstrom, Experts Say Immigrants Have Few Rights in Country, HOUS. CHRON., 
Sept. 20, 2001, at A8.
22Anthony Lewis, 1996 Immigration Act Needs Reforming, HOUS. CHRON., July 3, 2001, at A22.  
See also Immigrants Locked Up 3 Years Without Trials, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 2, 2001, at A15.
23The standards utilized by the European Court of Human Rights provide that a deportation order 
may be overturned when the interests of the non-citizen outweigh those of the United States.  
Note, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293 (2003).
24See, e.g., St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 
(2001) (changes in immigration consequences of a conviction require clear congressional intent in 
order to be imposed retroactively). As to retroactive effect of plea agreements, see, e.g., Dias v. 
INS, 311 F.3d 456, 458 (1st Cir. 2002); Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 290-91 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 559-60 (3rd Cir. 2002); Domond v. INS, 244 F.3d 81, 86 (2nd Cir. 
2001); Leguerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000). 
 As to differences in defining the term or as to the effect of an “aggravated felony,” see e.g., 
Leocal v. Ashcroft (unpublished) (11th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, “U.S.”, 124 S. Ct. 1405 (2004); 
Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2004); Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 942 (7th
Cir. 2001) (aliens convicted of an aggravated felony are ineligible for cancellation of removal); Le 
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
25See BALT. JEW. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1989 [title and page unknown], available at  
www.wiesenthal.com.
inclusion by the United States of Mexican Texas over the complaints in 1845 of Senator John C. 
Calhoun of adding an inferior group of “colored” people26 to the white American population, and the 
public school segregation of both blacks and Latinos through the 1970s.27  These historically racist 
practices have been substantially outlawed.  By the same token, the federal government’s abusive 
and constitutionally questionable practices in the immigration arena should cease.  Such a result will 
mean radical departures from judicial precedence, such as eradicating the fiction that any 
deportation-related abuses do not constitute punishment.28  Even conceding that deportation is civil 
in general, it unquestionably loses that characteristic when removal is conditioned upon a penal 
conviction.29
Specific incidents of injustice might assist the reader in the horrific impact the 1996 
Immigration Acts can have.30  One involves a woman who had lived in the United States for twenty-
eight years.  In 1989 she was convicted of writing a forged check for under twenty dollars.  This 
26David J. Weber (ed.), FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE
MEXICAN AMERICANS 137 (University of New Mexico Press, 1973) (quoting CONG.  GLOBE, 
30th Cong., 1st Sess.  98-99).  The highly respected Calhoun stated, “Ours, sir, is the Government 
of a white race.  The greatest misfortunes of Spanish America are to be traced to the fatal error of 
placing these colored races on an equality with the white race.”  Id. at 135 (emphasis added). 
27See, e.g, Guadalupe Salinas,  Mexican Americans and the Desegregation of Schools in the 
Southwest, 8 HOUS. L. REV. 929 (1971); Jorge Rangel & Carlos Alcala, De Jure Segregation of 
Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 307 (1972).
28E.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (deportation is not punishment); 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (since deportation is not 
punishment, neither is indefinite incarceration pending deportation a form of punishment); United 
States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1 (9th Cir. 1994).
29See 110 Stat. 3009-597, § 304 (b), creating 8 U.S.C. §
§ 1229b (a) (3) (1994 ed., Supp. V); see definition of aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43).
30Some incidents do not raise sympathy, such as the case where an alien was convicted of 
possession with the intent to deliver two pounds of cocaine, Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 
1035 (7th Cir. 2003), and the case of Tuan Ahn Nguyen, Nguyen v. INS, 525 U.S. 852 (2001),   
convicted in 1992 of child sexual assault.  Erroneously believing he was a US citizen by virtue of 
his American soldier father, a soldier in Vietnam, Nguyen, as a deportable alien, faced return to 
Vietnam which he left at the age of six. See Patty Reinert, Supreme Court ruling means veteran’s 
son may be deported, HOUS. CHRON., June 12, 2001, at A4. 
conviction qualified her with the passage of the 1996 Immigration Acts and the retroactive 
application of the law to banishment from the United States and from her mother to a country she 
would not likely recall since she immigrated at the age of four.31  The writer further recalls the news 
story of a decorated Vietnam veteran in South Texas who received his notice from the INS to appear 
and show cause why he should not be deported.  It seems this war hero had a drinking problem that 
resulted in a felony driving while intoxicated conviction.  He had also been sober for several years 
when he faced deportation.32  The federal appellate court for Texas later concluded that felony drunk 
driving does not meet the “aggravated felony” definition.33
This erroneous application of the law did not prevent the extreme punitive result of death.  
One of the nineteen aliens who died in the suffocating heat of an enclosed tractor trailer in Victoria, 
Texas in May 2003 had been improperly removed as a criminal alien for a driving while intoxicated 
conviction.  Mateo Salgado, a twenty-year resident of Houston, served his sentence for driving while 
intoxicated and then received a government-sponsored trip to the Mexican border.  Upon his 
removal, Salgado called Houston and told his family that he would return soon.34  He did return, but 
the family could only have access to his corpse.35  He should never have been exposed to the risks of 
sneaking back into the country where he was a permanent resident alien who had not breached his 
contract to remain in the United States.  There are too many other stories that reflect an ugly side of 
31See Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets--Immigration Law’s New 
Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 591 (1998); see Sarah Kershaw & Monica Davey, 
Plagued by drugs, tribes revive ancient penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 1 (reference to 
banishment as “severe” and “excessive”). 
32See Note, Deporting Nonviolent Violent Aliens: Misapplication of 18 U.S.C. §16 (B) to Aliens 
Convicted of Driving Under the Influence, 52 DE PAUL L. REV. 901 (2003).
33See, e.g., United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001).  The writer does not 
extend this principle to a death resulting from driving while intoxicated, even a first-time incident. 
 This would, in the opinion of the writer, constitute a crime of violence.  See Teen deaths prompt 
INS to deport illegal immigrants for DUIs, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 29, 2000, at A19.
34Edward Hegstrom, Illegal immigrant died trying to return to family, HOUS. CHRON., May 23, 
2003, at A33.
35 Id.  Salgado was not identified until more than a week after the tragedy.
our nation’s current immigration policy.36
III. Congressional Plenary Power in the Area of Immigration and Naturalization
The courts of the United States have concluded that Congress enjoys plenary, i.e., full and 
complete, power in the area of immigration.37 As a sovereign nation, America unquestionably 
possesses inherent power to deport aliens.38  The nation also has the power to exclude undesirables:
That the government of the United States, through the action 
of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a 
proposition which we do not think open to controversy.  Jurisdiction 
over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every 
independent nation.  It is a part of its independence.  If it could not 
exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of 
another power.39
The Court further explained that the powers to regulate foreign commerce and admit subjects of 
other nations to citizenship are sovereign powers “restricted in their exercise only by the 
Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice. . . .”40   The Court defers to 
Congress on matters involving purely  “political questions,” but we see how the Court later 
conceded that it had power in the area of political questions if violations of the constitutional rights 
of persons in the various states existed.41
36E.g., Ana Radelat, Banned at the Border, HISPANIC 41-46 (Feb. 1998).
37See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712 
(1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); United States ex rel. Knauff 
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950);  Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 
(1953); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); see generally Natsu Taylor Saito, The 
Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases:  The “Plenary Power” Justification for On-
Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 15 (2003).
38Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 557 (1913).  The Supreme Court also held in the Chinese 
Exclusion Cases that Congress has the authority to exclude nationals of another country.   Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889). 
39Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889) (emphasis added). 
40Id. at 604.
41See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 
(1963) (“one person, one vote”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
Unquestionably, one aspect of a nation’s sovereignty is the power to regulate the admission 
of aliens.  The United States, like any other nation, can base its immigration policy on racial, 
religious or other suspect grounds.42  However, once a person attains permanent resident alien status, 
American constitutional standards apply.43  For years, the treatment of aliens differed on the basis of 
which government conducted the discriminatory treatment.  Yick Wo v. Hopkins44 involved state 
action while the Chinese Exclusion Case45 involved federal law.  The Supreme Court did not 
develop an equivalent equal protection standard for federal action until its decision in Bolling v. 
Sharpe46 in 1954.  Even before this date, however, the Court had ruled that illegal entrants must be 
afforded constitutional protections in criminal proceedings.47
Fong Yue Ting v. United States48 addressed the validity of a federal law that required a 
Chinese to establish a certificate of residence by the word of at least one white citizen.  The Court 
upheld this clearly racist statute on the basis of international law and particularly on the absolute and 
unqualified right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, equating this power to their right to 
prohibit and prevent their entrance.49  The Court additionally stated:
The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.  It is not a 
banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the 
42See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (federal law required an affidavit 
from a white citizen to establish the right of a Chinese alien to a certificate of residence; persons 
of Chinese race were not deemed to be credible witnesses).
43See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Court voided a city ordinance on equal 
protection ground since the discrimination appeared based on hostility towards the race and 
nationality of Yick Wo and his fellow litigants in the laundry business; the litigants were now 
aliens who invoke the jurisdiction of the Court).
44118 U.S. 356 (1886).
45Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889).
46347 U.S. 497 (1954) (school segregation outlawed in the District of Columbia under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
47Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (voiding a section of the 1892 immigration 
act which called for imprisonment at hard labor without a trial).
48149 U.S. 698 (1893).
49Id. at 707.
expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment.  It is 
but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien 
who has not complied with the conditions. . . .  He has not, therefore, 
been deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . 
. .
50
The Court concluded by classifying this issue as one best left for resolution to the political 
department of the government.51
IV. AEDPA and IIRIRA: The 1996 Immigration Acts and the “Aggravated Felony”
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),52 combined with the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),53 [hereinafter referred to as the 
1996 Immigration Acts] extensively amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).54
 The INA historically provided in section 212 (c) that the Attorney General could exercise discretion 
in deciding whether to waive deportation of an alien otherwise subject to deportation or removal.55
The 1996 Immigration Acts changed aspects of this law by restricting the circumstances under which 
aliens could seek relief from the Attorney General or other officials.56 Other major changes 
involving the administrative and military detention of aliens came with the passage of the PATRIOT 
Act, an acronym for the real title of the legislation, “Unifying and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.”57
IIRIRA, enacted a few months after AEDPA, went a step further and repealed section 212 
50Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
51Id. at 713.  One hundred years later, Congress, the political department, enacted the punitive 
immigration acts that are the subject of this article.
52Pub. L. 104-142, § 401-443, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-81 (1996), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (a) 
(7) (2001) [hereinafter 1996 Immigration Acts].
53Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. at 3009-546 through 3009-724 (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et 
seq.(West 2000) [hereinafter 1996 Immigration Acts].
5466 Stat. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. [hereinafter INA].
55Id.§ 212 (c).
56See  8 U.S.C. § 1229b (a) (cancellation of removal); § 1229b (b) (cancellation); § 1229c  
(voluntary departure); § 1231 (b)(3) (restriction of removal); § 1225 (a) (1) (withdrawal of 
application for admission); and § 1158 (political asylum).
57Pub. L. 107-56 (Oct. 26, 2001).
(c), replacing it with a new section excluding from the class entitled to relief from removal those 
persons who had been previously “convicted of any aggravated felony.”58  Congress first utilized the 
“aggravated felony” concept in 1988, making an alien deportable if convicted of such a described 
felony, regardless of how long before the crime had been committed.59  The 1996 Immigration Acts 
went even further in defining the term “aggravated felony,” which, for example, now includes 
convictions for theft or burglary if the alien receives a term of imprisonment of at least a year (as 
opposed to five years in the pre-IIRIRA era).60 The amendment further includes convictions for 
fraud and deceit where the victim lost over $10,000 (as opposed to $200,000 before IIRIRA).61
Criminal defense practitioners now have to contend with the dilemma, for example, that a resident 
alien with a pre-1996 conviction in which he received a one-year suspended sentence for 
misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury became removable on September 30, 1996, the effective 
date of the second Immigration Act and the date the resident alien’s previous conviction legislatively 
transformed from a misdemeanor into an “aggravated felony.”62
Finally, Congress expanded the term “aggravated felony” to include any “crime of 
violence”63 resulting in a prison sentence of at least one year (as opposed to five years before).64  The 
term “crime of violence” includes offenses which have as an element “the use, attempted use, or 
58110 Stat. 3009-597, § 304 (b), creating 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (a) (3) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis 
added); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (definition of aggravated felony).
59Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4469-70 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (2000). 
60Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (G) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.).
61Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (M)(i) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.).
62Maynard, supra note 3, at 29; INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (2000).  Appellate courts have 
held that misdemeanor shoplifting convictions with a one-year suspended sentence or potential 
sentence amount to aggravated felonies.  E.g., United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 153 (2d 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 791-92 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845 
(1999).
6318 U.S.C. § 16 (1994 ed., Supp. V); INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (2000).
64Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.).  Apparently, an 
actually served sentence of 364 days in jail custody does not meet the one-year requirement.  See
Maynard, supra note 3, at 28; see also Stanley G. Schneider, Post-Conviction Remedies, State Bar 
of Texas 2003 Immigration Law Course, Ch. 3.1 (2003).
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” or “any other offense that 
is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”65 The sovereignty rights 
and relations between the state and the federal governments begin to fade with the enactment and 
enforcement of this provision of the 1996 Immigration Acts.
Since the 1996 Immigration Acts multiplied the number of so-called “aggravated felons” by 
expanding the definition and by applying the concept retroactively, the legislation raises serious 
constitutional questions.66  One might determine that some of these new crimes that qualify for the 
additional sanction of removal (deportation) are neither “aggravated” nor “felonies.”  The term 
“aggravated,” for example, when describing a crime, denotes that the criminal activity has been 
made worse, more severe, or more offensive.67  Some of the offenses included do not involve any 
violence and thus seem to be far from “aggravated.”  
In addition, the 1996 Immigration Acts conflict with other federal legislation that define a 
“felony” as any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.68  As a 
result, a number of so-called “felonies” under the immigration statutes qualify as misdemeanors 
6518 U.S.C. §§ 16 (a), (b) (2000).  Around the United States, many aliens have appeared at show 
cause hearings and have been removed for the “crime of violence” of driving while intoxicated.  
The Fifth Circuit later reversed its previous ruling and held that driving while intoxicated, without 
aggravating factors, is not a crime of violence. United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th
Cir. 2001); contra, Tapia-Garcia v. INS,  237 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2001).
66See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. 5; see generally Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1999) (due process/fair notice concerns created by retroactive 
legislation); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment reaches congressional and other federal action).
67WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 18 (1958).
6818 U.S.C. § 1 (1) (1984) (emphasis added).  Any other offense is a misdemeanor.  18 U.S.C. § 1 
(2).  Section 1 was repealed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,  Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, §§ 
211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, 2027 (1984). Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II  § 218 (a)(1), Oct. 12, 
1984, 98 Stat. 2027.  The historical definition of a felony continued in U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 (c) (1998).  Congress threw a curve, however, with its 1996 
definition and examples of aggravated felonies.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43) (A)-(U) (1999).
under not only the federal criminal code but also state provisions.69  One student writer comments 
“These laws are not only cruel, but also wildly inconsistent, meting out the same punishment to 
lawful permanent residents who commit a misdemeanor offense as they do to undocumented non-
citizens who enter the country to commit a terrorist act.”70   For instance, IIRIRA provides that a 
crime where the potential, not necessarily the actual, sentence is one year in custody qualifies as an 
“aggravated felony.”71 Yet these one-year-maximum-sentence crimes meet the misdemeanor 
definition of many state penal codes and the former federal code.72
In an Orwellian73 sweep, deportations became “removals.”74  Those once described as 
excludable became “inadmissible.”75  However, the most critical changes related to those who 
became eligible for removal.  Congress mandated that the Attorney General shall take into custody 
any alien who is “deportable”76 by reason of having been convicted of a single crime involving 
moral turpitude committed within 10 years after the date of admission of a permanent resident alien 
if the crime provided for a sentence of one year or longer, two or more chronologically separate 
crimes involving moral turpitude, a controlled substance offense (other than possession of 30 grams 
69E.g., TEX. PEN. CODE §§ 1.07 (23) and (31) respectively provide that a felony includes an 
offense punishable by death or imprisonment in a penitentiary and a misdemeanor is one 
punishable by fine, by confinement in jail, or by both.  The maximum punishment for a 
misdemeanor is confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year.  TEX. PEN. CODE § 12.21 
(2) (1996).
70Note: Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293, 327-28 (2003).
718 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (1996).
72TEX. PEN. CODE §§ 1.07 (23) and (31) respectively provide that a felony includes an offense 
punishable by death or imprisonment in a penitentiary and a misdemeanor is one punishable by 
fine, by confinement in jail, or by both.  The maximum punishment for a misdemeanor is 
confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year.  TEX. PEN. CODE § 12.21 (2) (1996); 18 
U.S.C. § 1 (2). 
73G. ORWELL, 1984, at 45 (1949) (reference to the euphemistic replacement of words).
74
 Pub. L. 104-208, §§ 308 (e)(1)(E), 308 (e)(2)(C) substituted “removed” for “deported” in the 
introductory paragraph.  8 U.S.C. § 1227, Historical and Statutory Notes (1999).
75
 Pub. L. 104-208, §§ 308 (e)(1)(E), 308 (e)(2)(C).
76
 Congress apparently did not succeed completely in their Orwellian efforts.
or less of marijuana), violations involving a firearm or destructive device, espionage, treason, 
making false statements in applications to depart from or to enter the United States, and an 
aggravated felony at any time after admission.77 The Attorney General, subsequent to the 1996 
Immigration Acts, concluded that the Attorney General’s Office did not have any authority to waive 
deportation.78
The INA defines an aggravated felony by listing 21 classifications and grades of crimes.79
Until 1984, the federal criminal code defined a felony as an offense punishable by imprisonment for 
a term exceeding one year.80  The current sentencing classification continues the practice of 
classifying the lowest felony as one that carries “more than one year” imprisonment.81  Class A 
misdemeanors are those in which the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is one year or less 
but more than six months.82  However, when Congress amended the INA through the 1996 
Immigration Acts, it included convictions for a misdemeanor as an “aggravated felony” when it 
specifically included a crime of violence or theft or burglary offenses for which the term of 
imprisonment is at least one year.83  The legality of the contradiction necessarily has to be addressed 
by Congress or the courts. That one-day difference in federal criminal law and immigration law 
effectively increases the number of permanent resident aliens who need to worry about their eventual 
77
 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 (c)(1)(B), (C); 1227 (a)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iii), (B), (C), (D) (emphasis added).  
The Seventh Circuit joins the First and Ninth Circuits in concluding that Congress intended to 
apply the amended “aggravated felony’ definition retroactively.  Flores-Leon v. INS, 272 F.3d 
433, 439 (7th Cir. 2001).
78See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (2001). 
79
 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (A)--(U).
80
 18 U.S.C. § 1, repealed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,  Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, §§ 
211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, 2027 (1984);   U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL  4A1.2 
(c) (1998) (For sentencing purposes, a felony offense means any federal, state, or local offense 
punishable by death or a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, regardless of the actual 
sentence imposed) (emphasis added).
81
 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (a) (5) (2000).
82
 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (a) (6) (2000) (emphasis added).
83
 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (G); 8 U.S.C.  1101 (a) (43) (P),  (R), and (S).
removal from the United States.84 What makes this concern of even greater constitutional impact is 
the decision by Congress to apply the aggravated felony label “to an offense described in this 
paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law” and to any such offense “regardless of 
whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996.”85
Consequently, the 1996 Immigration Acts create serious conflicts for the constitutional right 
to procedural and substantive due process of law under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Procedural due process of law guarantees all persons in the United States the right to 
notice of the rules by which our conduct will be regulated and punished.  Permanent resident aliens 
who plead guilty to a crime at a time when punitive removal orders are not mandated expect to move 
on to a life free from further government control.  In addition, a law that forecloses any opportunity 
for relief must be categorized as one that is arbitrary and capricious.  The 1996 Immigration Acts 
provide that an immigration judge may not consider mitigating factors; such factors are allegedly not 
relevant since everything turns on whether the alien was convicted of an “aggravated felony.”  In 
addition, the deportation is not subject to judicial review.86  The Supreme Court addressed this 
patently questionable provision in INS v. St. Cyr.87  The Court resolved the constitutional concern by 
holding that certain aliens could not be deported retroactively and that Congress did not intend to 
eliminate habeas corpus in these limited circumstances.88
V. The Supreme Court’s Deportation Rulings--A Constitutional Enigma?
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy89 exemplifies a rather extreme circumstance.  The Supreme Court 
84Philip Martin and Elizabeth Midgley, Number of Foreign-Born Reaches All-Time High in U.S.--
up to 32.5 Million, available at http://www.hispanicvista.com/html3/061603gi.htm.
858 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (emphasis added); see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A), (B).  
Congress also included  attempts and conspiracies to commit an enumerated offense, but the 
Congress inadvertently or oddly excluded solicitations to commit a crime.
86IIRIRA §§ 304 (a), 306 (a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2) (C)).
87533 U.S. 289 (2001).
88Id. at 320-26.
89342 U.S. 580 (1952); see also Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) ( non-citizen eligible for 
deportation for offense committed several years before the federal deportation law enacted even 
in Harisiades permitted the deportation of a legal resident alien because of membership in the U.S. 
Communist Party.  The membership occurred at a time before U.S. law specifically outlawed such 
activity.  The Court noted that the involved aliens had been “offered naturalization, with all of the 
rights and privileges of citizenship, conditioned only upon open and honest assumption of undivided 
allegiance to our Government.”90  However, the dissent questioned how the majority could uphold 
the view that “the power of Congress to deport aliens is absolute and may be exercised for any 
reason which Congress deems appropriate.”91 The dissent also noted that “the power of deportation 
is . . . an implied one.  The right to life and liberty is an express one.  Why this implied power should 
be given priority over the express guarantee of the Fifth Amendment has never been satisfactorily 
answered.”92  Fifty years later, this nation still has not directly rationalized this constitutional 
aberration.
Galvan v. Press93 represents another deportation to rid the United States of an alien affiliated 
with the Communist Party.  Galvan became a resident of the United States in 1918.  He joined the 
Communist Party from 1944-46.  He was then deported in 1950, even though the U.S. Constitution 
allowed Communist Party candidates to appear on California ballots.  Justice Frankfurter, in 
upholding the deportation on stare decisis grounds, nevertheless questioned the practice by stating:  
“And since the intrinsic consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might 
fairly be said also that the Ex Post Facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legislation, 
though alien had been in the United States since the age of three); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 
(1924) (no ex post facto claim where Congress in 1920 added deportation as an additional 
sanction to the conviction for prior violation of the Selective Service Act and the Espionage Act; 
the Court cited the safety and welfare of society as a factor).
90Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 585.  American citizenship is not a bar to deportation.  If the 
government can establish fraud, then the naturalization can be set aside and the suspect can be 
deported.  United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950).
91Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 598 (quoting from Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 
(1893)).
92Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 599 (emphasis in original).
93347 U.S. 522 (1954).
should be applied to deportation.”94
V. Deportations/Removals Constitute Punishment
A. The Constitutional Basis for Deportations
The dissents in Fong Yue Ting95 are noteworthy.  Justice Brewer takes judicial notice of 
more than 100,000 resident aliens, persons who have lawfully entered the United States with the 
intention to remain.96  The justice notes that those “who have become domiciled in a country are 
entitled to a more distinct and larger measure of protection than those who are simply passing 
through, or temporarily in it, [a concept that] has long been recognized by the law of nations.”97
On the question whether deportation constitutes punishment, Justice Brewer emphatically 
states:
Deportation is punishment.  It involves first an arrest, a deprival of liberty; and, 
second, a removal from home, from family, from business, from property. . . . It 
needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is 
punishment. . . . But punishment implies a trial: “No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”98
It will later be shown how individuals, later deemed removable under the 1996 Immigration Acts, 
have been subjected to a “trial,” even if they did not know at the time of their plea of guilty that they 
would face further punishment, i.e., removal, in the future.
Interestingly, Justice Field, the author of the opinion in the Chinese Exclusion Case, also 
dissented in Fong Yue Ting.  He begins by noting “a wide and essential difference” between 
94Id. at 531.  For support that some deportations are downright arbitrary, see United States ex rel. 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (alien female married an American while she 
worked with the U.S. government in Germany; the Attorney General determined confidentially 
that she posed a risk to the United States; Court reasoned that it was not for any court to review 
the actions of the political branch of government in excluding a given alien).
95149 U.S. 698 (1893).
96Id. at 734 . The most recent census reports that the United States has over thirty-one million 
non-citizen residents.  
97Id. 
98Id. at 740. 
exclusion and deportation of those who have acquired a residence in the United States.99  He notes 
that the majority opinion is replete with citations to support the exclusion of aliens but only a few 
loose observations as to the national power to expel and deport aliens domiciled in the United 
States.100
The writer agrees that individuals who entered the United States with fraudulently obtained 
permission deserve to have their status revoked and to be removed from the United States.  In those 
cases, the federal government never had a genuine opportunity to accept the alien as a resident. 
Deception invalidated the agreement, failing at the stage of assent to the terms.  Similarly, 
individuals who violate the implicitly given promise of abiding by the laws of the states and of the 
United States during their status as permanent resident aliens can lose that status.  Our procedural 
due process jurisprudence would put those immigrants on notice that their invitation to become 
resident aliens, and possibly later American citizens, would be rescinded upon the violation of 
certain laws.  The real debate centers on the practice of enacting ex post facto laws, a practice so 
abhorred for historical reasons by our Founding Fathers that it received not one comment only but 
instead two prohibitive directives, one for the national government and one for the states.101
The United States Constitution does not actually give Congress plenary power over 
immigration; it instead gives the Congress the power to establish a “uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.”102  This is far from granting Congress absolute immunity and unrestricted authority 
in the “removal” of individuals who have committed “aggravated felonies,” words that have made 
their way into our legal lexicons through an Orwellian twist.103 Congress unquestionably has power 
99Id. at 746. 
100Id. at 756. 
101See U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, cl.3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”) 
& Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall ...pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . ..”)
102U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
103G. ORWELL, 1984, at 45 (1949).  Orwell’s character discusses Newspeak by stating, “It’s a 
beautiful thing, the destruction of words.  Of course the great wastage is in the verbs and 
to determine who has earned the coveted title of American citizen through naturalization.  Since the 
Constitution remains to this date explicitly silent on the authority of the United States to engage in 
the practice of expatriation or banishment of resident aliens, then the courts must identify a provision 
that implicitly places this authority in the Congress.  Assuming arguendo that the Naturalization 
Clause grants Congress this power implicitly, then the remaining question is whether the explicit 
provisions of the Constitution that provide all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States the 
guarantees of equal protection and due process apply to resident aliens as well.104  The writer 
contends that a resident alien, a person who has gained entitlement to a greater degree of protection 
than undocumented aliens, can nonetheless legally face deportation or removal for having been 
convicted of a qualifying crime.  However, the writer asserts that such punitive actions can 
constitutionally occur only if the legislative enactments overcome ex post facto concerns and meet 
procedural and substantive due process standards as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.105
B. The Role of the Common Law in American Jurisprudence
As the United States and her people battled through the courts with Watergate and other civil 
rights crises, jurists making the ultimate assessments oftentimes determined whether rights and 
privileges existed at common law.  To the American student of the law, it appears that our courts 
invite an inherent conflict by mixing principles and attitudes forged during very different periods of 
time.  Early decisions invited the new republic to discard the common law whenever inapplicable to 
adjectives, but there are hundreds of nouns that can be got rid of as well.”  In 1983 Walter 
Cronkite wrote a preface to this book in which he asserted: “We hear Newspeak in every use of 
language to manipulate, deceive, to cover harsh realities with the soft snow of euphemism.”  Id. at 
1.
104See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-370 (1886) (The Fourteenth Amendment extends 
to the protection of non-citizens).
105U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law. . . .”) (governing federal conduct); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
(governing state conduct); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Bridges 
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-370 (1886).
the situation or repugnant to other rights and privileges.106  Thus, the American common law model, 
especially beginning in the mid-1950s, provided progressive pronouncements.107  On the other hand, 
the English model adheres to traditional principles, not even changing where sound reasoning based 
on development of the truth necessitates an adjustment or reversal of a rule of law.108
American courts have begun to abandon English common law principles.109  A quite recent 
example involves the abandonment of a common law concept dating back to the 13th century.  In 
Rogers v. Tennessee110 the accused faced a murder indictment even though the victim died after the 
expiration of a year and a day.  The common law recognizes the validity of a murder prosecution if 
the death occurs within a year and a day of the assault.  The Supreme Court of Tennessee 
acknowledged that the common law had been in force at the time of the death, but the court 
nevertheless upheld the validity of the murder indictment, reasoning that the issue had hardly ever 
surfaced in state law.111  The United States Supreme Court sustained the murder conviction, even 
though the applicable rule at the time of the fatal act provided for a lesser crime other than 
murder.112   The common law is an English mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a mode of treating 
106Pawlet v. Clark, 9 U.S. (Cranch) 292 (1815); see generally Van Ness v. Pacard,  27 U.S. (2 
Pet.) 137, 144 (1829).
107E.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (the precise contours of official 
immunity do not have to be derived from the strict liability rules of the often arcane English 
common law); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (an indigent defendant must be furnished 
with a trial transcript to effectuate appellate review).
108E.g., The Queen v. Kearley, 2 App.Cas. 228, 2 W.L.R. 656, 2 All E.R. 345 (H.L. 1992) 
(Implied statement is hearsay; American federal rules of evidence as interpreted in U.S. v. Zenni, 
492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980) declare such indirect assertion is not hearsay because it is not 
intended as an assertion.  See FED. R. EVID. 801 (a)).
109E.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (Court held that judicial immunity is limited to 
protection from liability for damages; it erects no bar to injunctive and declaratory relief, or the 
award of attorney’s fees under the civil rights statute); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (A 
state district judge is not immune for administrative, i.e., non-judicial, employment decisions).
110532 U.S. 451 (2001).
111Id. at 465-67.
112Id. at 480-81.
legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules.113  Such rules evolve around principles, 
which remain firm in the face of formidable attempts to overthrow or to supersede them.114  Not 
even the American Revolution and its ultimate goal of liberation from the Crown kept the new 
nation from occasionally citing English common law doctrine as precedent.115  Undoubtedly, the 
common law had its highly reputable supporters, such as Sir William Blackstone, perhaps the most 
influential of these advocates.  Professor Blackstone, so enamored with the common law, wrote four 
volumes regarding the evolution of English law.116  Scholars who revere Blackstone’s work adhere 
to his warnings against wholesale and radical change of the legal system and his cautions against 
overturning the entrenched wisdom of the past.117
On the other hand, a number of colonies disregarded the English model.  For one, very few 
law-trained professionals migrated to the New World, and those bold immigrants who came brought 
with them little support for lawyers.118  Second, colonies like New England, centered their law, for 
better or worse, so that it would be “agreeable to the word of God,” with absolutely no reference to 
the common law of England.119  Professor Pound provides a third concern against the development 
of an American common law prominently shaped by the English model.  Pound observed that the 
English common law had evolved with trained jurists while the American model, involving “an 
elective judiciary, holding for short terms, . . . does not give us courts adequate to such a task.”120
113ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (Marshall Jones Co. 1921) [hereinafter 
POUND].
114Id.
115Id. at 6. 
116See BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 4 Volumes (Wayne 
Morrison, ed., 2001, Cavendish Publishing Limited) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE].
117Id. at xiii-xiv.
118PAUL S. REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 18 (Gordon 
Press 1977, based on his 1898 thesis at the University of Wisconsin) [hereinafter REINSCH]. As in 
other colonies, lawyers were so unpopular in New York that the general cry of the people was “No 
lawyer in the Assembly.”
119REINSCH 11.     
120POUND 7.  The writer, a sixteen-year veteran of the trial bench, fully agrees with Professor 
He criticized the biased and narrow-minded decisions in the early part of the twentieth century as the 
work of popularly elected judges.121  One scholar noted that the more simple, popular and general 
parts of the English common law initially influenced colonial legal relations, yet he found in the 
colonies originality in legal conclusions, departing widely from the most settled theories of the 
common law.122  Scholars often express respect for the common law, yet the common law serves as 
the clearly established rule of judicature in only a few cases.123
Nothing stated here should suggest any desire to bury the common law in the sacred grounds 
of the past in order to make room for an allegedly enlightened new age.  The common law affords 
American legal scholars and practitioners with superb ammunition in their battle to seek justice.  For 
instance, in addition to the notable characteristics of predictable rules, the common law effected 
individual natural rights and secured individual interests against aggression and arbitrary invasion 
not only by others but also by state or society.124  That, in itself, places the jurisprudence of the 
Crown on a pedestal worthy of protection akin to that given by environmentalists to endangered 
species.  Yet some scholars recognize that certain aspects of our Anglo-American legal traditions 
must expire and drift into oblivion, preserved in the history books where they merely serve as 
materials for scholars to peruse and possibly yearn for the days of yore.
The writer humbly submits that Professor Pound’s concern about the proper development of 
the American common law, including his preoccupation with an elective judiciary, remains with us 
today.  However, the distress today involves not only elected judges but also appointed judges.  The 
political element so dominates the election and selection of judges in America today that the public 
Pound’s observations.  This opinion from such a noted scholar furthers the view that the United 
States Supreme Court, comprised of jurists who serve for life, needs to fulfill their mission as set 
forth in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (a statute in conflict with the 
Constitution is void ).
121POUND 7.
122REINSCH 7.
123Id. at 57. 
124Id. at 101.  
has begun to have less confidence in our judiciary and its lack of independence.125  The 1980s 
brought this nation twelve consecutive years of Reagan-Bush, a political era marked by a policy or at 
least a practice of appointing youthful and extremely conservative lawyers to the federal judiciary.126
C. Do Removals/Deportations Constitute Punishment Under Traditional Concepts?
A review of English common law history leads us to several examples where the English 
courts utilized the practice known as banishment or transportation, the ancient equivalent of today’s 
deportation.127  The primary distinction between these two practices involves the characteristics of 
the candidates for exile and disappearance from the nation that removes the person.  In England the 
deportees were citizens or subjects of the Crown who had, pursuant to due process of law, lost their 
right to remain among the civilized people of the English countryside.  Their banishment came as an 
integral part of the punishment for the conviction of a crime.128  According to Blackstone, the exiling 
or banishing of subjects are punishments that the common law once imposed.129  On the contrary, in 
125For example, Harris County (Houston), Texas had in the 1970s an all-Democratic judiciary.  
Today it is 100 per cent controlled by the Republican Party from the County Courts to the two 
appellate courts.  Some candidates even advertise their partisan label as a job qualification. See 
generally Stephen Murdoch, The Politics of Judicial Nominations, WASH. LAWYER, Sept. 2002, 
at 26.
126See generally Marianne Means, Estrada right to quit nomination fight, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 
13, 2003, at A 40 (“Democrats are just as partisan but not as unified nor driven to reshape the 
judiciary along a hard-edged ideology.”); Michael Olivas, Being Latino doesn’t qualify Estrada to 
be judge, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 12, 2003, at A 31 (Law Professor Olivas refers to Estrada as an 
ideologue who hides his views and lacks experience).  As a federal prosecutor, the writer appeared 
before Judge Hayden Head, appointed by President Reagan at the age of thirty-three to the district 
court bench in Corpus Christi, Texas.  The same president later appointed Edith Jones, about the 
same age, to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Notwithstanding their youth and conservative 
ideologies, both have distinguished themselves in their respective courts.
127See generally  Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the 
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 115 (1999).
128See 1 BLACKSTONE 102.
129Id. (emphasis added).  See also Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why 
at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 305, 345 (2000).
America today the deportees are legal resident aliens130 whose banishment and transportation out of 
the United States sometimes involves conduct which occurred at a time when the resident alien 
lacked notice that his or her conduct would, in some indefinite time in the future, result in his 
involuntarily leaving his job, his spouse, his children and his grandchildren while he seeks to begin a 
new life in a country where generally he no longer has any established roots.  
This writer submits that removals or deportations, modern-day banishments, constitute 
punishments.  Deportations do not serve as treatment for an alleged offender;131 nor does a removal 
involve efforts to supervise.132 Instead, the removals constitute punitive measures separately 
appended to and/or conditioned upon convictions for criminal activity.133  The INA defines 
“conviction” as a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication has been 
withheld, where “(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge 
has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.”134
Arguably, an alien who receives a deferred adjudication type of probation or community supervision, 
a program that seeks to give wrongdoers a second chance by clearing their record by dismissal of the 
130This article does not question the removal of undocumented persons so long as our due process 
protections are utilized to minimize the risks of abuse. In the United States constitutional rights 
have been historically extended to resident aliens on a basis similar to citizens.  See, e.g., 
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Court held unconstitutional a Civil Service 
Commission regulation requiring citizenship for most federal civil service positions); In re 
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (Court voided a Connecticut law requiring citizenship as a 
prerequisite for admission to the bar); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 386 (1886) (Court held aliens are entitled to equal protection of the laws).
131E.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997).
132E.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U. S. 694 (2000) (re-imposition of supervised release does 
not violate the ex post facto clause).
133One way to qualify for removal under the 1996 Immigration Acts is to have a conviction for an 
aggravated felony committed on, after or even before the effective date of the 1996 legislation. 8 
U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A).
1348 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A) (emphasis added).
conviction, can be removed under the 1996 Immigration Acts.135 In some cases, where the status of a 
“conviction” bothers the government’s immigration attorney, the attorney instead relies on the INA’s 
requirement of showing an unlawful presence in the United States and/or alien smuggling 
activities.136
What makes the current practice in the United States suspect is the inclusion of punishment, 
specifically removal or deportation, for convictions that did not mandate that sanction prior to the 
1996 Immigration Acts.  In other words, the 1996 Acts clearly impose a condition that adversely 
affects the liberty interest of the non-citizen resident alien.  As such, that action should meet the 
constitutional standards of due process and of the prohibition against ex post facto laws.  Our 
constitutional law forbids retroactively increasing the punishment for an existing offense.137   As a 
people, Americans, regardless of status, possess a fundamental fairness interest in having the 
government abide by the rules of law it establishes to govern the circumstances under which it can 
deprive a person of his or her liberty.138
A recent Supreme Court case provides some interesting history on the concept known as 
banishment.139  The Court’s dissent in Stogner discussed how only a parliamentary act could subject 
an individual to banishment in 17th-century England and how Parliament’s power to pass such acts 
was unquestioned.140 Most relevant, however, is the comment that a “sanction of banishment was 
135E.g., Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999) (successful completion of deferred 
adjudication in Texas constituted a conviction); accord, United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94 
(2d Cir. 1999) (INA does not indicate need to interpret in accordance with state law).
136E.g., Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F3d 804, 817 n. 15 (5th Cir. 2002) (reference to standards 
of proof under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a) (1) (B), (E) (i)).  The relaxed procedures in these immigration 
cases allow the use of hearsay statements by the investigating agent, who is permitted to produce a 
Form I-213, where the transported aliens’ statements are recorded. 
137E.g., Dep t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
138See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) (Ex Post Facto Clause is violated where the rules of 
evidence changed, allowing less testimony for conviction than the law required at the time of the 
alleged commission of the offense).
139See generally Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2466-69 (2003).
140Id. at 2467 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
acknowledged as a punishment provided for by the existing laws, both at the time of Clarendon’s 
trial and afterwards.”141  The contrast between the rights from banishment of the English citizen 
and the American resident alien blurs into irrelevance when we superimpose American 
constitutional protections on the legal map.  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments discuss the rights of “persons,”142 the drafters perhaps recognizing the classification of 
slaves as non-citizens and the involvement of people from other countries in our nation’s evolution.  
The post-Civil War amendment obviously sought to assure that all persons, not just citizens, 
received the constitutional safeguards. Aliens accordingly receive protection under this 
amendment.143  Some authorities exist to support the claim that aliens held by our government 
outside United States territory have no constitutional protections.  For example, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals held in 2003 that detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba have no right 
to hearings in United States courts since they are not entitled to due process rights under the 
Constitution.144  While the writer does not necessarily agree with this principle, the rationale 
nonetheless suggests that those persons who reside legally in the United States should enjoy full due 
process protections.145
D. Is Removal, Conditioned Upon a Criminal Conviction, a Punishment? 
A critical question surfaces as to whether a legislated response to conduct, whether deemed 
criminal or civil, is classified as “punishment” or as a mere “sanction.” Regardless of the label the 
141Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 11 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 569 
(1938)); see generally Craies, Compulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm, 6 L. Q. REV. 388, 392 
(1890) (“Banishment, perpetual or temporary, was well known to the common law”); An Act for 
Punishment of Rogues, 39 Eliz. 1, c.4, s. 4 (1597) (permitting banishment of dangerous rogues); 
the Roman Catholic Relief Act, 10 Geo. 4, c. 7, s. 28 (1829) (providing for the banishment of
Jesuits). 
142U. S. CONST. amend. 14.
143See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 (1982).
144See Sam Hananel, Prisoners held at Guantanamo have no U.S. rights, court rules, HOUS. 
CHRON., March 12, 2003, at A8; Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
145Accord, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (emphasis added).
response receives, another inquiry centers on whether the designation lessens the need for 
intervention of protections possibly found in the United States Constitution.  Webster defines   
“punish” as follows: “to cause to undergo pain, loss, etc., as for a crime” and “to impose a penalty 
for [an offense].”146 Something is “punitive” if it inflicts or is concerned with punishment.147  The 
term “punishment” further indicates “harsh treatment.”148  On the other hand, a “sanction” has an 
almost contrary meaning.  One view has a sanction meaning support or approval while the other 
denotation, the one addressed in this article, refers to a coercive measure,149 such as an economic 
boycott or payment of a fine. Thus, removal is far from a mere sanction when the removal is 
conditioned upon a conviction for a qualifying crime.  The removals authorized by the 1996 Act 
qualify as an after-the-fact increase in punishment.
Writers in the field of criminal law have sought to distinguish the boundaries of criminal 
punishment as opposed to other coercive burdensome but non-criminal sanctions.150 For example, 
in the immigration field, deportation or removal is provided as a coercive sanction when the agents 
identify an undocumented entrant.  The administrative process of immigration law enforcement is 
then triggered. At this stage the law does not call for criminal punishment.  The INS agents dutifully 
make entries in their files that an undocumented alien entered the United States and that the alien 
received a voluntary departure or that he underwent a deportation hearing. All this occurs in civil 
administrative proceedings.
The fact that this removal arises in an allegedly non-criminal setting does not remove the 
punitive aspect of the removal.  On the other hand, when a sanction is imposed in a criminal court, 
146WEBSTER S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 427 (V. Neufeldt ed., 1990) (emphasis added).
147Id.
148Id. 
149Id. at 520.
150G. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 4, 5 (1998), quoted in  M. GARDNER & R. 
SINGER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: CASES, MATERIALS AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 39 
(3rd ed. 2001) [hereafter CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT].
or pursuant to a criminal conviction, it is unquestionably punitive.  The fact that a federal law 
retroactively incorporates state (or federal) criminal conduct that resulted in a conviction and adds a 
removal sanction does not make it less punitive.  The sanction would not have occurred but for the 
criminal conviction.  At this point constitutional protections of due process of law and the Ex Post 
Facto Clause must stand as barriers to the trampling of constitutional rights.
In urging radical departures from precedence, the writer is not oblivious to the well-
established principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull151 in 1798.  In 
Calder the Court stated the Ex Post Facto Clause is limited to criminal cases.152  Since deportations 
or removals have been judicially classified as civil in nature, there is arguably no constitutional 
protection.  However, a scholar has taken the position that we look at the totality of the 
circumstances in deciding if a practice should receive constitutional scrutiny:
[T]here are recurrent problems in assessing the punitive nature of other 
sanctions, such as ... expatriation, deportation. ... That the legislature has identified 
these sanctions as civil in nature does not control the constitutional issue, for if the 
sanction is punitive, if it constitutes “punishment,” then regardless of the legislative
label, the process is criminal and the constitutional guarantees apply.153
Another writer defines punishment in terms of five elements:
1. It must involve pain or have other unpleasant consequences;
2. It must be for an offense against legal rules;
3. It must be of an actual offender for his offense;
1513 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); see also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898) (Where a 
physician is convicted of abortion, a felony, the state is seeking not to further punish such a 
criminal but to protect its citizens from physicians of bad character when it makes it a crime to 
practice medicine).
152Id. at 391.
153G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 408-09 (1978), quoted in CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENT 39; see Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (For a civil confinement statute to 
avoid being punitive in nature, the ultimate purpose must be to treat and not to punish) and United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (Court found the pre-trial detention of a criminal 
defendant to be regulatory and not punitive).
4. It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the 
offender; and 
5. It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal 
system against which the offense is committed.154
It is the position of the writer that the term punishment includes the practice, currently referred to in 
our federal law as “removal,” which has over the years encountered euphemistic synonyms.  
Historically, removal has been known as banishment, transportation, exile, expatriation, deportation, 
to name but a few.155  In his writings on the common law of England, Blackstone, the source for our 
American jurisprudence, elaborates on the personal liberties violated when a person is driven from 
his country:
A natural and regular consequence of this personal liberty, is, that every Englishman 
may claim a right to abide in his own country so long as he pleases; and not to be 
driven from it unless by the sentence of the law. ... But no power on earth, except the 
authority of parliament, can send any subject of England out of the land against his 
will; no, not even a criminal.  For exile, and transportation, are punishments at 
present unknown to the common law; and, whenever the latter is now inflicted, it is 
either by the choice of the criminal himself to escape a capital punishment, or else by 
the express direction of some modern act of parliament.  To this purpose the great 
charter declares, that no freeman shall be banished, unless by the judgment of his 
peers, or by the law of the land.156
A formal removal order further aggravates the alien’s conduct when the alien’s spouse is 
faced with the dilemma of remaining in the United States to work and provide for their children or 
154H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-6 (1968), quoted in CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENT 40; see also T. Hobbes, Leviathan 353, 355 (C. MacPherson ed. 1971), quoted in 
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 42.
155See 1 BLACKSTONE 102; see, e.g., Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) 
(deportation of a permanent resident alien is “the equivalent of banishment or exile”); however, 
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1951), later repeated the view that deportation is not a criminal 
proceeding and has never been held to be punishment. 342 U.S. at 537.
1561 BLACKSTONE 102 (emphasis added).
returning to the life of poverty or persecution that they initially abandoned.157 A removal 
requirement pursuant to a criminal conviction should thus be legislatively articulated 
contemporaneously as part of the punishment attached to the crime. That is the only means by 
which a resident alien or other person will have adequate notice as to the consequences of a waiver 
of a trial by jury and a guilty plea resulting in a conviction, protections which the United States 
Constitution grants to all persons regardless of citizenship.158  Even if removal is not clearly 
articulated as a condition of a criminal act, such drastic governmental action satisfies the concept of 
punishment where it is triggered by a conviction.  Deportation has been equated to a forfeiture of 
residence and thus a penalty.159
VI. The Ex Post Facto Clause
A. A Review of Supreme Court Ex Post Facto Decisions
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution refers to legislative acts when it 
provides “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”160  It is consequently necessary 
to proceed primarily and initially with this constitutional standard in determining the validity of 
157See generally id. at 343 (“The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, 
is a principle of natural law; ... they would be in the highest manner injurious ... if they only gave 
their children life, that they might afterwards see them perish.”)
158See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. ...”); see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No 
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); see U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law”) (emphasis added in text and footnote).
159Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (deportation is a drastic measure and at times 
the equivalent of banishment or exile); see Sarah Kershaw & Monica Davey, Plagued by drugs, 
tribes revive ancient penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 1 (reference to banishment as a 
“severe  and bygone punishment”). 
160U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl.3.  The principle is sometimes referred to by the Latin phrase nulla 
poena sine lege, which basically means “no punishment without a law authorizing it.”  BRYAN A. 
GARNER (ed.), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (7th ed.1999) (emphasis added).
federal legislation which removes permanent resident aliens from the United States on the basis of 
having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  The concerns with ex post facto laws prompted an 
essay comment by James Madison that such laws are contrary to the principles of the social 
compact.161
An early case involving the interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause is Beazell v. Ohio,162 a 
case that addressed a change in the law from a separate to a joint trial for persons indicted jointly.  
The defendant argued that such a change violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.  The Court disagreed 
since the change involved only the rules of procedure and not the traditional substantive matters 
addressed in Calder.163  The Court further stated that the Constitution intended through the Clause to 
secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation.164  Interestingly, the 
Court emphasized that the “criminal quality attributable to an act, either by the legal definition of the 
offense or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, should not be 
altered by legislature enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the accused.”165
Whether the removal is classified by statute or by the courts as civil in nature is irrelevant for 
the purposes of deportations that result from pre-1996 convictions.166  In United States v. Ward167
the Supreme Court stated that whether a statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal requires 
answers to two questions: first, did Congress designate the penalty as civil or criminal; second, if the 
penalty has a civil designation, is it so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate Congress’ 
intention.168 It is the writer’s contention that the mere reference of a sanction, in this case removal, to 
161THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 at 282 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
162269 U.S. 167 (1925).
163Id. at 170.
164Id. at 171.
165Id. at 170.
166See generally Pace v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 399, 400 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (“In order to be a 
forbidden ex post facto measure, a statute that is civil in nature on its face must effect a 
punishment”).
167448 U.S. 242 (1980).
168Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
an event, specifically a criminal conviction, suffices to classify the action as punishment.  The 
reaction is then beyond a mere sanction.  Once mandated by federal statute, what could once be 
termed a “sanction” graduates to the level of de jure punishment.  The removal action serves to 
promote the retributive, preventive and deterrent aspects of our punishment system. 
When Congress enacted the 1996 Immigration Acts, it enlarged the class of individuals who 
could be deported for aggravated felonies.  Congress effectively created two constitutional problems. 
 First, it created an ex post facto issue by declaring that the aggravated felony provision applies 
regardless of when the conviction occurred, even if it preceded the effective date of the act.  Second, 
Congress created a substantive and procedural due process concern because some crimes are neither 
felonies nor aggravated.169 Additionally, most lawyers, including even board-certified criminal law 
specialists, lack the ability to predict future political and legal mandates.  When those accused or 
their lawyers waive their jury trial right and plead guilty or nolo contendere, neither knew that the 
convictions would thereafter result in additional sanctions or punishments.  Such issues have 
resulted in an incredibly high number of court confrontations in recent years.170
Undoubtedly, the battle to have the High Court extend the application of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause to civil immigration deportation proceedings faces an almost insurmountable history of long-
established judicial precedence.171 Since 1798, the Supreme Court has conclusively held that the 
169The 1996 Immigration Acts, in their retroactive aspect, create arbitrary and capricious results by 
redefining the felony concept in federal law.  The Acts also eliminate the concept of adequate 
notice of negative implications for one’s conduct, especially as the conduct relates to the waiver of 
constitutional rights at a time when the negative implications were not capable of being known.
170E.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 (2001); 
Zadvydas v. Davis,  533 U.S. 678 (2001); Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 310 F3d 825 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(whether or not transporting aliens constitutes an aggravated felony); United States v. Trinidad-
Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (intoxication assault does not constitute a crime of 
violence); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 
F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001); Tapia-Garcia v. 
INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).
171See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).  Quite recently, the First Circuit reiterated 
that the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated by a civil deportation.  Seale v. INS, 323 F3d 150, 
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal matters.172  However, Blackstone 
recognized that the common law could change when he stated that stare decisis “admits of 
exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason. . . .”173  Blackstone 
further recognized that the common law was English in origin, suggesting that the American 
colonies had to adopt and apply it in appropriate circumstances.174
Wise men and women have often articulated that a nation is judged by how their laws and 
their courts treat people within their jurisdiction.  The United States, in spite of early constitutional 
aberrations, has, through her courts, extended protections to persons at all levels of the social, racial 
and political spectrum.175  We should not allow political extremism, exacerbated by economic fears 
and other concerns of the American public, to dictate a change in the role of the courts in protecting 
the rights of the less privileged.176  Unfortunately, the terrorist attacks on America’s towers and 
defense center have driven several public officials to support measures that restrict the civil liberties 
of not only Americans but also resident and other aliens in this country.177
The federal Ex Post Facto Clauses provide limitations on criminal prosecutions for acts that 
159-160 (1st Cir. 2003); accord, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1951).
172 See Calder generally.  The Court has further distinguished retrospective laws from ex post 
facto laws, holding that retroactive legislation is not necessarily in conflict with the United States 
Constitution.  See, e.g., Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1882); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 
(1890); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894).
1731 BLACKSTONE  69.
174See id. at 107-08.
175E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (aliens); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 
(1954) (Latino citizens); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (African American 
school children); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (undocumented alien school children).
176For example, in 1994 California voters, under the leadership of Governor Pete Wilson, 
approved Proposition 187, an effort to deny education, social services and some health benefits to 
undocumented immigrants.  A federal judge ruled that the effort violated the Constitution.  Judge 
overturns prop. 187, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 19, 1998, at A23.
177Reinert, Experts Fear Net Ensnarls Liberties, H OUS. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2001 at A1 (Attorney 
General Ashcroft unsuccessfully has asked Congress for authority to jail immigrants indefinitely, 
without charges or a visit to a magistrate as well as the authority to secretly search people s 
homes).
were not proscribed at the time committed.178 The Founding Fathers, apparently addressing the 
Congress, included that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,”179 and then in 
the next section repeated the message to the states.180 Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence has 
evolved to include various circumstances.  For instance, if an act was already classified as a crime, 
then a violation of the constitution occurred if the legislative branch aggravated the crime, for 
example by changing the degrees of murder, or openly increased the punishment,181 or reduced the 
measure of proof necessary to convict the accused.182
Take the situation of a recidivist who discovers that after his two prior felony convictions, 
his home state decided to pass a “three strikes and you are out” law, making him eligible for life 
without parole upon a new felony accusation. The previous statutory scheme provided that an 
habitual violator could qualify for parole upon the receipt of good conduct and other credits.  At trial, 
his lawyer asserts that the change in the law is ex post facto since he had already been convicted and 
had served his sentences for the two prior crimes.  Without those two convictions as enhancements 
of the punishment range, he qualifies for parole.  However, counsel will likely lose this plea since 
courts have historically held that a statute is not ex post facto because it increases the punishment for 
a subsequently-committed crime where the increase results from an enhancement allowed by the
178See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3 & art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 16. 
179U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl.3.
180Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall ...pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law . . . .”).
181See, e.g., Scafati v. Greenfield, 390 U.S. 713, 88 S. Ct.1409 (1967) (statute forbade deductions 
for good conduct time during the first six months re-incarceration following parole violation).
182E.g., DeWoody v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 52, 87 Cal. Rptr.210 (1970) found an
impermissible ex post facto legislatively-created presumption of driving under the influence of an 
intoxicating liquor where the proof established a certain level of alcohol in the driver’s blood.  
The law took effect after the arrest of the accused.  The new evidentiary system would allow 
conviction on less proof than previously required.  Accord, Plachy v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 405, 
239 S.W. 979 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922) (change in the accomplice statutory requirement of 
corroboration in prosecutions involving sellers of intoxicating liquors two weeks after the 
indictment).
prior convictions.183
The Supreme Court has long been involved with the protection of constitutional rights in 
civil proceedings.  For example, in juvenile adjudication proceedings, legislative policy dictates that 
youthful offenders be treated as non-adults.  However, the courts generally held that this policy did 
not deprive children of rights that adults had when they faced quasi-criminal accusations in adult 
court.  For example, the Court in In re Gault184 decided that juveniles have the right to adequate
notice and counsel and protection of their privilege against self-incrimination.  The Court followed a 
few years later with In re Winship185 where the Court stated that even though a juvenile adjudication 
proceeding is civil in nature, the proof necessary for an adjudication must be based on the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard, a standard reserved for criminal cases.186
More recently, in Seling v. Young,187 the State of Washington enacted a statute that 
authorized the commitment of sexually violent predators to a treatment facility where the offender is 
in the custody of an agency dealing with social and health services. The act defines a sexually violent 
predator as someone who has been convicted of, or charged with, a crime of sexual violence and 
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage 
in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.  The accused in Young was 
183See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 S. Ct.389 (1901); State v. Dowden, 
137 Iowa 573, 115 N.W. 211 (1908).
184387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967).  A few years before In re Gault, the Court ruled in Kent v. United 
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) that the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to adult status must comport 
with due process.  
185397 U.S. 358 (1970).
186In spite of the extension of rights known in the criminal process to the civil juvenile process, 
the Court has held that trial by jury is not constitutionally required in the adjudicatory phase of the 
state juvenile court delinquency proceeding.  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 
(1971).  The Court distinguished the right to a trial by jury from other constitutional rights 
accorded juveniles, pointing out that these prior rights emphasized the integrity of the fact finding 
process and rationalizing that there is nothing to confirm that the jury is a necessary component of 
accurate fact finding. 
187531 U.S. 250 (2001).
convicted of six rapes.  Prior to his release, the State filed a petition to commit Young to the 
treatment facility as a sexually violent predator.  Young appealed his commitment to the facility 
arguing that the law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Young argued that 
the Act, as applied, violated the U.S. Constitution since the conditions in the facility were similar to 
being incarcerated.188
The Court disagreed with Young, basing its decision on Kansas v. Hendricks189 where the 
Court addressed the issue of whether the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act was punitive in 
nature.  In addressing the issue, the Court stated that the question of whether an act is civil or 
criminal in nature is determined by statutory construction.190  In Hendricks the court held that the 
court must ascertain whether the legislature intended the statute to establish civil proceedings.  A 
court will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only where a party challenging the Act provides the 
clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the 
State’s intention.191 Based upon Hendricks, the Court in Young held that the Washington statute was 
enacted to be civil in nature, concluding that “the conditions of confinement were largely explained 
by the State’s goal to incapacitate, not to punish.”192  Therefore, based upon the precedent set in 
Hendricks, the Court held the non-punitive statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 
United States Constitution.193
188See id. at 259-60.
189
 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
190531 U.S. at 261; see  Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1951) (Deportation is not a 
criminal proceeding and has never been held to be punishment).  
191Young, 531 U.S. at 261.
192Id. at 262.
193Id. at 267. The Supreme Court has also held that changes in parole consideration intervals from 
every three to every eight years in life sentences did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause since it 
did not create a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the crime.  
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 251 (2000); see also California Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 
U.S. 499 (1995).
The Supreme Court recently encountered an ex post facto violation.  In Carmell v. Texas 194
the Court reviewed the amendment of a Texas statute that allowed for a person to be convicted of a 
sexual offense based upon the victim’s testimony along with other corroborating evidence. The 1993 
amendment allowed convictions based upon the victim’s uncorroborated testimony alone.  The 
prosecution charged Carmell with 15 counts of various sexual offenses that began in 1991 and ended 
in 1995.  Carmell contested convictions for several pre-amendment counts. The Court held that the 
pre-amendment convictions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Citing Weaver v. Graham,195 the 
Carmell Court stated:  “The critical question [for an ex post facto violation] is whether the law 
changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.”196  The State argued that 
the amended statute did not increase the punishment nor change the elements of the offense. The 
Court however found that the amended statute reduced the amount of evidence required to 
convict.197 Carmell further cited Calder v. Bull198 where Justice Chase categorized four types of ex 
post facto laws: (1) Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which 
was innocent when done criminal; (2) Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it 
was, when committed; (3) Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, 
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed; and (4) Every law that alters the legal rules of 
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the 
commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.199
Whether a statute is criminal or civil in nature, one must look to the legislative intent when 
the statute was enacted.200   In Kansas v. Hendricks,201 the State of Kansas enacted the Sexually 
194529 U.S. 513 (2000).
195450 U.S. 24 (1981).
196529 U.S. at 520.  
197See Carmell, 529 at 532-33; see also id. at 553 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1983 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
199Id. at 390-91.
200See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
201521 U.S. 346 (1997).
Violent Predator Act to provide for the “civil commitment” of sexual offenders in a treatment center 
for long-term care and treatment.  Hendricks, classified as a sexually violent offender, was 
committed to a treatment program required by the act, and he complained that the statute violated the 
Ex Post Facto Clause.  Hendricks argued that the Act established criminal proceedings and a form of 
punishment.  He specifically argued that because he had already been convicted and served his term 
of confinement, the Predator Act allowed for additional punishment based upon his past acts. 
The Court held that the Act did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.  The majority held that 
to determine whether the Act established civil or criminal proceedings, the Court must look to the 
legislative intent when the Act was established and enacted.  Based upon the legislative intent the 
Court determined that on the face of the statute the legislature did not intend to create a criminal 
proceeding.202  To overcome this, the person challenging the statute must show “the clearest proof 
that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to 
deem it civil.”203
Hendricks further states that the purpose of the statute is not retroactive since it does not 
punish the sexual offender for his past conduct.  The offender’s past conduct is used primarily for the 
purpose of “[demonstrating] that a mental abnormality exists or to support a finding of future 
dangerousness.”204   Citing United States v. Salerno,205 the Court reasoned:  “Although the civil 
commitment scheme at issue here does involve an affirmative restraint, ‘the mere fact that a person 
is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed 
punishment.’”206  Therefore, based upon the Court’s reasoning, they found the Act to be civil in 
nature and not punitive and thus not in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
202Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added).
203Id. (emphasis added). 
204Id. at 362.  
205481 U.S. 739 (1987).
206521 U.S. at 363. 
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch207 represents a forceful authority for the proposition 
that the 1996 Immigration Acts enact punitive removal orders in violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  Authorities arrested members of the Kurth family for harvesting marijuana on their
property.  The Kurths pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess drugs with the intent to sell.  
Subsequently they entered into a plea agreement and the family members were sentenced.  Montana 
enacted the Dangerous Drug Tax Act prior to the Kurths’ arrest.  The Act provided “that the tax was 
to be ‘collected after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied.’”208  The Kurths 
challenged the constitutionality of the Montana tax under the Double Jeopardy Clause.  They argued 
that the tax was punitive in nature because the legislature conditioned it upon commission of a 
crime.  
The Court held that the tax violated the Constitution.  In evaluating this issue, the Court cited 
United States v. Halper209 where the Court stated that the legislature’s description of a statute as 
civil does not foreclose the possibility that it has a punitive character.210 Kurth Ranch evaluated the 
tax and how it was applied under the Act.  The Court pointed out that the tax was conditioned upon 
the commission of a crime.211  Only after the crime is committed and the person arrested is the tax 
imposed.  Further, the tax was different from other types of taxes in that the tax was imposed on 
illegal activities. 
In Halper, the defendant was charged and convicted on 65 counts of violating the criminal 
false claims statute.  Subsequent to his conviction and sentence, the Government brought an action 
under the civil False Claims Act.  Based upon his criminal conviction, the District Court granted a 
summary judgment for the Government.  Under the remedial provision of the act he was liable to the 
207511 U.S. 767 (1994).
208Id. at 770.
209490 U.S. 435 (1989).  
210Id. at 442.
211The writer contends that the removal complained of in this article is one conditioned upon a 
conviction based upon conduct finalized prior to the effective date of the 1996 Immigration Acts.
government for more than $130,000.  Based upon the large amount, the District Court found it to be 
a second punishment for double jeopardy purposes.  The Government appealed to the Supreme
Court to clarify whether a civil penalty such as a statutory penalty can constitute punishment for the 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The Court held that the statutory penalty was a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The 
government argued that only a second criminal prosecution would give rise to double jeopardy, 
adding that the statute involved is civil in nature. In addition, based upon statutory construction, they 
contended the Act was not intended to be criminal in nature.  The Court held, however, that even if 
the Act was intended to be civil in nature, the penalty may be so extreme as to constitute 
punishment.212  The Court further held that when determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause 
of the Constitution has been violated depends not upon statutory interpretation or intent of the 
legislature, but on the character of the sanctions that are imposed on the individual.213   The Court 
stated, “Simply put, a civil as well as criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as 
applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment.”214  In concluding that the statute in 
this case did constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy, the Court stated that a civil 
sanction serving a remedial, retributive or deterrent purpose was punishment.215
The Supreme Court later decided Hudson v. United States216 and criticized its holding in 
Halper for deviating from longstanding double jeopardy principles by focusing on whether the 
sanction was so grossly disproportionate to the harm caused as to constitute punishment.217 Hudson
restates the principle that whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a 
212Halper, 490 U.S. at 442.
213Id. at 447.
214Id. at 448.
215Id.
216522 U.S. 93 (1997). 
217Id. at 101-02.
matter of statutory construction.218 A legislature could indicate expressly or impliedly if the statute is 
criminal or civil.  If the legislature considers the law to be criminal, much of the inquiry is 
completed.  However, even in those situations where the legislature indicates an intention to 
establish a civil penalty, the Court inquires further as to whether the statutory scheme is so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to “transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a 
criminal penalty.”219
In addition, the Hudson Court noted the need to adhere to the factors listed in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez220 as useful guidelines.  These include 1) whether the sanction involves an 
affirmative disability or restraint; 2) whether the sanction has been historically regarded as 
punishment; 3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; 4) whether its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of punishment--retribution and deterrence; 5) whether the behavior to 
which it applies is already a crime; 6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it; and 7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative 
purpose assigned.221
VII. Pre-1996 Act Convictions Lead to Unconstitutional Ex Post Facto Removals
A. The Punitive Aspects of the Removal Provisions of the 1996 Immigration Acts
Let us begin with the reality that the legislative history of the 1996 Immigration Acts is 
punitive in its major and overriding aspects.222  The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center 
basement and the 1995 destruction of the Oklahoma City federal building incited Congress to act.  
The first act passed, the AEDPA, has a section entitled “Terrorist and Criminal Alien Removal and 
218Id. at 99.
219Id.
220372 U.S. 144 (1963).
221522 U.S. at 99-100, quoting from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 
(1963).
222The 1996 Immigration Acts, in their removal provisions, can arguably be classified as 
regulatory.
Exclusion.”223 In addition, representatives for the Department of Justice asserted: “The chief target 
of these reforms are the statutory and administrative protections . . . that enable alien terrorists to 
delay their removal from the U.S.”224
Furthermore, applying the Kennedy factors to the 1996 Immigration Acts and its removal 
provisions for those convicted of aggravated felonies, the immigration sanctions clearly adopt a 
punishment scheme.  Since the removals can relate back to convictions finalized prior to the 
effective date of the 1996 Immigration Acts, they send a clear signal that the statute is punitive.  The 
removal action is conditioned upon an alien’s conviction for a specified crime.  As such, the Act 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  First, the removal sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint.  Once convicted of an aggravated felony, the resident alien is given a notice to appear, i.e., 
summoned to show cause as to why he should not be removed.  The alien seldom wins this contest.  
A long-term resident alien with substantial equities could qualify for removal from his entire family, 
friends, property and employment.   
Second, removal from one’s country of residence has historically been regarded as 
punishment.  It may have been known as transportation, exile, expatriation, or banishment in the 
days of the common law, but it nonetheless served as punishment for criminal activities.  Third, 
removal is triggered under the 1996 Immigration Acts by conviction of a crime, all of which require 
a finding of scienter (aggravated felonies, crimes of violence, drugs, etc.).  Fourth, the removal seeks 
to promote the traditional aims of punishment, which prominently include retribution and deterrence. 
 This factor suffices clearly insofar as a prospective crime is involved, but it is constitutionally 
repugnant since the conduct to which the removal attaches occurs in the past as opposed to the 
present or the future.  
Retribution for conduct not explicitly classified as punishable by removal is just plain mean 
223142 CONG. REC. 948 (1996).
224Id. at 948-49. 
and shocking to the sensibilities of our free society.  One could expect such conduct in a totalitarian 
state, but for this to exist in American jurisprudence is highly aberrant.  Seeking to impose 
deterrence for conduct not explicitly classified as punishable by removal is quite simply arbitrary and 
capricious.  One who becomes aware after the fact of a sanction imposed subsequent to alleged 
improper conduct can hardly be deterred.  The inevitable result is further punishment in a form that 
Congress should have imposed ab initio.
Fifth, and perhaps the most explicit factor establishing removal as punishment, the removal 
sanction is conditioned upon behavior already classified as a crime.  If one commits an aggravated 
felony, then removal is a related punishment.  The writer sees no constitutional problem with this 
type of law.  However, the flaw occurs when the 1996 Immigration Acts increase the punishment for 
previously committed crimes.  Sixth, the alternative purpose arguably assigned to the removal 
provision centers on the plenary power of Congress in the field of immigration and naturalization.  
The writer has previously asserted that the Constitution grants Congress the explicit power to 
regulate naturalization, and implicitly immigration as well, but Congress does not possess the 
plenary power to override other human and civil rights of people within the jurisdiction of the courts. 
 As to the seventh factor, the comments in the sixth Kennedy factor understandably advance the 
position that removal is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.225
Kurth Ranch also promotes the writer’s argument.  In concluding that the tax for the 
possession of the marijuana was so exaggerated as to constitute punishment,226 the Court stressed 
that the tax was conditioned on the commission of a crime and was imposed only after the taxpayer 
had been arrested, thus limiting its application to a person charged with a crime.  In the removal 
provision of the 1996 Immigration Acts, these factors exist as well.  The alien has been convicted of 
225See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963).
226See generally Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994); contra United 
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (forfeiture had non-punitive goals, i.e., it encouraged 
property owners to avoid the use of their property for illegal purposes, it was not tied to scienter,
and it was imposed in rem, rather than in personam).
his qualifying crime.  The removal occurs in response to the arrest and the crime.  As to the focus of 
this article, the removal occurs even though the alien committed his societal wrong before the 
sanction was legislatively enacted.
Who could foresee that Congress would supplement the punishment set forth in the penal 
codes of the various states by enacting later legislation which would result in the removal and 
banishment from their adopted country, not to mention isolation from their families?  The benefit of 
having a lawyer with a clairvoyant view on the evolution of immigration-related criminal law would 
logically assist the accused in deciding whether to intelligently and competently waive his right to a 
jury trial in either the state or federal court.   However, justice does not rely on lawyers with 
extrasensory tools to assist in its administration.  Procedural due process, at a minimum, dictates that 
the parties in a criminal setting know what the litigation and constitutional rules are.  An accused 
cannot possibly act intelligently and competently if the additionally punitive rules are not in place 
until several years after a conviction is returned on a plea bargain disposition.227  Some jurisdictions, 
like Texas, require a trial court, before accepting a guilty plea, to inform defendants that a conviction 
in the absence of US citizenship could result in exclusion, removal or denial of US citizenship.228
Others merely state that failure to advise a client of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea 
does not nullify an otherwise voluntarily and knowingly entered plea.229
To allow the removal of resident aliens convicted of so-called aggravated felonies prior to 
the effective date of the 1996 Immigration Acts violates a principle of justice “so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”230  Does this practice of 
changing the rules of procedure and punishment after the fact violate those “fundamental principles 
227See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 468 (1938) (The Court effectively held that an 
accused has the right to counsel in all federal criminal trials).
228See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13 (a) (4) (1985) (The immigration consequences 
language was added to the plea requirements in 1985).
229See, e.g., United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7 (4th Cir. 1988).
230See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105 (1934).
of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions”?231  This writer 
asserts that it does.  Of course, the writer concedes that numerous precedents exist against the 
argument that the removal provisions found in the 1996 Immigration Acts are unconstitutional.232
Notwithstanding, the writer urges the Supreme Court and the Congress to correct the abuses created 
by the 1996 Immigration Acts so that we as a people can return to the constitutional foundation upon 
which the United States built its government and its republic.  
The Founding Fathers, reacting to a history of oppressive practices in Great Britain, included 
specific wording in the Constitution to protect against past abuses.  In declaring that retroactive 
legislation would be impermissible, the drafters directed their prohibitions against the Congress and 
then the States.  These leaders admonished Congress that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law 
shall be passed.”233  The drafters then instructed that “No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, 
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . .”234  The drafters undoubtedly 
contemplated only legislative action when it referred to bills and laws in the Constitution.  However, 
a persistent question in the evolution of our law is whether such legislation can include punitive civil 
matters.  The courts since time immemorial have held that the clause is limited to criminal 
statutes.235
A review of our American common law development leads the writer to conclude that our 
unique jurisprudence has room to evolve.  Nothing in our early constitutional history should obstruct 
the pronouncement of a rule that civil statutes, punitive in nature and/or in application, qualify as 
231Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 US 312, 316 (1926).
232See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); 
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (Deportation is not punishment; it is simply a 
refusal by the government to harbor persons it does not want).
233
 U.S. CONST. art. I,  9, cl. 3.
234
 U.S. CONST. art. I, 10, cl. 1.
235 See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 400 (1798); United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 
1 (9th Cir. 1994).
bills of attainder and/or ex post facto laws.236  On the contrary, rulings by the United States Supreme 
Court and other lower courts lend support to the writer’s thesis that the removals resulting from pre-
1996 convictions should undergo constitutional scrutiny.237
Ironically, Calder v. Bull,238 the case primarily cited for the principle that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause applies only to criminal cases, addressed a civil dispute.  The Calders and the Bulls battled in 
a probate court in 1793 while our nation adjusted to liberty and experienced the opportunity to 
develop its jurisprudence.  The Calders won.  The law did not provide for appeal or for a new 
hearing in probate court so the legislature of Connecticut in 1795, acting in a judicial capacity, 
effectively set aside the earlier decree in probate.239  The Bulls then prevailed.  The Court’s sole 
inquiry was whether the resolution or law of the State of Connecticut qualified as an ex post facto 
law within the prohibition of the United States Constitution.240  The Supreme Court answered in the 
negative.241
Justice Chase began his opinion in Calder by stating “The decision of one question 
determines (in my opinion) the present dispute.  I shall, therefore, state from the record no more to 
the case, than I think necessary for the consideration of that question only.”242  The new law or 
236 See Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829) (“The common law of England is not 
to be taken in all respects to be that of America.  Our ancestors brought with them its general  
principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that 
portion which was applicable to their situation.”)
237 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (indigent parents in 
civil child termination proceeding can qualify for court-appointed counsel); In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358 (1970) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juveniles in civil adjudicatory hearings 
entitled to rights normally limited to criminal cases); contra, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 
528 (1971) (juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial as not essential to the development of the 
truth).
238
 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
239 Id. at 386-87.
240 Id. at 387.
241 Id. at 390, 394-95.
242 Id. at 386 (emphasis in original).  The Court, promising to state no more than essential, 
nevertheless proceeded to engage in an extensive pronouncement on the criminal aspects of the 
bills of attainder and  ex post facto laws, alleged dictum later criticized by Justice Johnson in 
procedure no doubt adversely affected the Calders.  They lost a right to realty, not to liberty.  The 
Calder battle perhaps should have been settled on other grounds, but the ex post facto issue surfaced 
directly.  The Supreme Court addressed the history of bills of attainder, also known as bills of pains 
and penalties (bills which addressed lesser punishments) and of ex post facto laws (statutes which 
involved capital punishments).243  A majority and two analytically supportive concurring opinions 
consistently adhered to the premise that the history of ex post facto legislation centered on criminal 
and not on civil laws.244
The writer asserts that the 1996 Immigration Acts, albeit civil in context when it discusses 
removals, is so intertwined with the criminal convictions of permanent resident aliens that removal 
legislation is either punitive on its face or at least quasi-punitive in its application.  Consequently, the 
constitutional prohibitions involving the Ex Post Facto Clause necessarily apply.  Calder, often cited 
approvingly by courts denying relief to aliens in removal cases, actually appears to provide the 
rationale that the retroactive removal provisions of the 1996 Immigration Acts are unconstitutional.  
An analysis in support of this statement follows in the discussion of the Stogner decision.245
Justice Chase stated that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not secure a citizen in his private 
property or contract rights.246  However, the Court noted that the purpose of the clause is an 
additional bulwark in favor of the personal security of a person who is retrospectively subjected to 
punishment by a legislative act, specifically providing that a legislature should not pass a law “after 
a fact done by a subject, or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for 
having done it.”247 Justice Chase then stated the four categories of what he considered to be ex post 
Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416, 681-87 (1829).
243 Id. at 389.
244 Id. at 388-89.
245See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003) (Court ruled that a resurrection 
of an expired statute of limitations statute in child molestation cases violates the Ex Post Facto 
Clause).
246Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
247 Id. (emphasis in original).  Note the clairvoyance with which Justice Chase distinguished 
facto laws.248  Chase emphasized that these four categories, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust 
and oppressive, adding “Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; but every 
retrospective law is not an ex post facto law:  The former, only, are prohibited.”249  To be ex post 
facto, the law must create, or aggravate, the crime, or increase the punishment, or change the rules of 
evidence for the purpose of facilitating a conviction.250
Justice Paterson then proceeds to concur and provide further guidance on the ex post facto 
issue.  He cites the writings of Judge Blackstone as proof that the term unquestionably refers to 
crimes and nothing else and follows that with a supportive review of the constitutions of the various 
states.251  Specifically, Justice Paterson declares that the prohibition against the states has to be read 
in its entirety, i.e., that no State shall “pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” adding that the framers of the Constitution “understood and 
used the words in their known and appropriate signification, as referring to crimes, pains, and 
penalties, and no further.  The arrangement of the distinct members of this section, necessarily points 
to this meaning.”252
B. A Historian’s View of the Calder Ruling and the Ex Post Facto Clause
Not all constitutional scholars adhere to Calder’s restrictive interpretation of the Ex Post 
between a fact done by a subject and one done by a citizen.  The issues the courts encounter today, 
as a result of the 1996 Immigration Acts, specifically test this nation’s resolve as to the rights of 
legal immigrants who have invested their person, financial standing and families in the United 
States of America.
248 Id. at 390 (emphasis in original).
249 Id. at 391 (emphasis in original).
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 396-97 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE 6).  However, the Court later referred to the ex post facto 
prohibition against States as applying to civil as well as to criminal acts.  Ogden v. Saunders, 25 
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827); see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 138-39 
(1810) (the Court discussed the ex post facto issue in the context of a contract involving land ).
252 Calder, 3 U.S. at 397.  This position seems to strengthen the argument that criminal defendants 
who followed their lawyer’s advice and pled guilty on the belief that the then-existing law and 
policy would save them from deportation have a constitutional claim since they relied to their 
detriment on prior law.
Facto Clause.  Professor Leonard Levy has studied the question surrounding the basis upon which 
the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted.253  Should we read the notes of what occurred at the 
Constitutional Convention?  Or should we rely on other historical documents and the common law 
of England?  In his book Levy finds no evidence for grounding the law in original intent, arguing 
that judicial activism, the continual reinterpretation of the Constitution, is inevitable.254  His most 
critical observation, insofar as the theme of this article is concerned, centers on the instability of the 
ruling in Calder v. Bull255 when one studies all the viewpoints of the time of the Constitutional 
Convention.
The term “original intent” stands for the idea that the Supreme Court, in its interpretation of 
the Constitution, should adhere to the understanding of it by the Framers,256 people such as James 
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, Elbridge Gerry, and William Paterson, later a Supreme 
Court Justice on the Calder case.  Original intent should be followed when it is clear, and the courts 
should look to it as an interpretive guide.257  To that extent, those officials, at all three branches of 
government, who interpret the Constitution should be led by the Preamble that begins We the 
People,  a message that transmits the idea that the government of the United States exists to serve 
the people.258  President Lincoln best stated it when he said that this nation was conceived in liberty 
and dedicated to the proposition that all people are created equal.259
In assessing the meaning of terms in the Constitution, such as ex post facto laws, one can 
253Leonard W. Levy received the Pulitzer Prize in history for his work ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT.  He is formerly the Earl Warren Professor of Constitutional History at Brandeis 
University.  LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS  CONSTITUTION (1988) 
[hereinafter ORIGINAL INTENT].
254ORIGINAL INTENT at back cover.
2553 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
256ORIGINAL INTENT at x.
257Id.
258Id.
259Id.
conclude that the most important evidence of original intent is the Constitution itself.260  The writer 
places himself in the “interpretivist” category since he believes that courts should conform to the text 
of the Constitution, to original intent if it is clearly discernible, to principles and purposes derived 
from the Constitution, to history, and to precedents and conventional rules of construction.261  If the 
original intent is clear, then it can be said that the “plain meaning” approach applies.262  The Ex Post 
Facto Clause does not require the intervention of the Golden Rule exception, which is based on the 
logic that the legislature, or in this case, the Framers, would not have intended an unjust or ridiculous 
result.263  That is because the plain meaning of the Constitution unquestionably bars statutes which 
have a retroactive punitive approach.  Since there is an obvious difference of opinion among 
members of the federal judiciary as to the clarity and meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the writer 
seeks to articulate the reasons why the 1996 Immigration Acts violate the Constitution.
The strongest basis for upholding the 1996 Immigration Acts is the “purpose” approach.  
This method of interpretation directs the judge to the purpose behind the enactment of the statute.  
The idea is that since the purpose of the statute was to eliminate a particular wrong or mischief, the 
court should interpret the statute to produce the result.264  The Congress and the courts refer to the 
need to control our borders.  One of the 1996 Immigration Acts refers to “antiterrorism” in its title.  
One of the first terrorist acts in the United States occurred in 1993 in New York.  The second 
notorious terrorist act was committed not by an alien but by an American citizen in Oklahoma City 
in 1995.  The writer agrees that the purpose of the 1996 Immigration Acts, i.e., protecting our nation 
by removing criminal aliens, is appropriate.  However, the disagreement centers on their conflict 
with the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Thus, the “purpose” approach does not answer the legislative goals 
260Id. at xi.
261Id. at xv.
262See NITA, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 38-39 
(2002); see also Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956).
263See NITA supra at 40-41; see also United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961).
264See NITA supra at 43; see also Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S.  103, 117 (1990).
of those who sought enactment of these Acts.  
In interpreting the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the writer prefers 
“contextualism,” the process of using the context in which a statute was enacted to give the statute 
meaning.265  The process is merely extended to the Super Legislature, i.e., the Constitutional 
Convention, the group that enacted the Ex Post Facto Clause.    By reviewing how the term was 
utilized during the time period in which American leaders enacted the Constitution, we will better 
appreciate and understand the connotations of the term “ex post facto laws.”  
James Madison, considered the Father of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights, rejected 
the doctrine that the original intent of those who drafted the Constitution should be accepted as an 
authoritative guide to its meaning.266  The Framers apparently thought the original understanding at 
the convention did not greatly matter.267  Instead, the Framers considered significant things such as 
the text of the Constitution, construed in the light of conventional rules of interpretation, the 
ratification debates, and other contemporary expositions.268  Madison also relied on the ordinary 
rules of the common law applicable when construing a document and the history of the time.269  The 
one factor that Madison believed predominated in seeking the meaning of the Constitution centered 
on “the true spirit of liberty.”270  This spirit he believed came from the people who ratified the 
Constitution when acting through their state conventions and not from the framers.271
Professor Levy supports the writer’s position, i.e., that the Calder decision is flawed:  “The 
265NITA supra note 276 at 47; see, e.g., Third Nat’l Bank v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S.  312, 316-318 
(1977).
266ORIGINAL INTENT 1.  The fact that Madison discredited original intent might explain why he 
did not publish his “Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention” until 1840, fifty-three years after 
the Framers finished the draft of the Constitution.  Id.
267Id. at 2.  Professor Levy notes that Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist points to “the original 
understanding at Philadelphia” as being of prime importance.  Id.
268Id.
269Id. at 5.
270Id. at 6.  
271Id. at 17.
three [Justices] agreed that ex post facto laws comprehended criminal cases only and did not apply to 
civil cases or cases that affect property rights.  All three men seem to have been mistaken.”272  As 
Levy sees the development of the Calder opinion, the issue centered on whether legislation that 
operated retroactively against one’s civil interest encroached on the Ex Post Facto Clause.273  Justice 
William Paterson, a member of the Constitutional Convention, authored one of the opinions.  Justice 
Paterson made no reference to his recollections of the debates on the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Instead, 
he engaged in an effort to construe the term ex post facto by the location of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
in Article I, section 10.  Section 10 included some prohibitions, civil in nature, in a section ending 
with a semicolon.   Justice Paterson concluded that the Ex Post Facto Clause included only criminal 
matters in that the Clause was found after the semicolon where other prohibitions barred state bills 
of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and the granting of any 
title of nobility.274  In support of his position, Levy states:
Contrary to Paterson, “the arrangement of the distinct members of this 
section” does not “necessarily” prove that “the framers of the 
Constitution . . . understood and used the words . . . as referring to 
crimes, pains, and penalties. . . .”  The placement of the clause against 
titles of nobility shows that Paterson was wrong.  Moreover, the ex 
post facto clause appears in a list of prohibitions only one of which,
bills of attainder, is criminal in character.  Indeed, the clause sits 
between the bill of attainder clause and the contract clause, suggesting 
that ex post facto laws can involve crimes such as bills of attainder 
and civil matters such as contracts.275
Professor Levy also notes that The Federalist and Sir William Blackstone’s writings, 
previously referred to, assisted the Court in the Calder outcome.276  However, Levy notes that 
272Id. at 65.
273Id. at 66.
274Id. 
275Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 397 (1798)) (emphasis in original) (footnote 
omitted).
276ORIGINAL INTENT 67.
Justice Chase, the lead author in Calder, failed to quote The Federalist # 84 where Alexander 
Hamilton had merely called ex post facto laws “formidable instruments of tyranny,” because they 
created enemies “after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of men to 
punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law. . . .”277  Levy asserts 
that neither Hamilton nor Blackstone ever suggest that ex post facto laws did not concern civil 
matters or that they concerned criminal matters only.278
The ratifying conventions of the various states provide interesting views on this topic, 
particularly since the comments made by the leaders of the various states provide guidance as to the 
meaning of the Clause.  The Calder opinion referred to four state constitutions for the definition of 
the term ex post facto.  Two referred to criminal matters; the other two did not use the term, but they 
referred to oppression from laws that punished actions not criminal when made.279  Pennsylvania 
and South Carolina added an ex post facto clause to their Constitutions.  The drafters apparently took 
their ex post facto language from the United States Constitution “without in any way referring to 
criminal matters.”280  The 1784 New Hampshire provision proves even more explicit that the term 
ex post facto encompasses civil matters: “Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive and 
unjust.  No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the 
punishment of offences.”281
The North Carolina ratification debates in 1788 also confirm the civil nature of ex post facto
laws.  James Iredell, who later became one of the justices in the Calder majority, debated the 
possible ex post facto impact on the state’s currency laws.  Timothy Bloodworth argued against 
ratification because the Constitution banned state laws allowing payment in paper money for debts.  
Bloodworth feared the ban might be applied ex post facto.  Another debater, Stephen Cabarrus, 
277Id.
278Id.; but see Calder, 3 U.S. at 396-97 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE 6).
279ORIGINAL INTENT 68.
280Id. (footnote omitted).
281Id. (footnote omitted).
stated the state’s currency laws would survive since the Constitution prohibited ex post facto 
legislation by Congress.282 “Iredell, answering Bloodworth, agreed with Cabarrus by revealing his 
understanding that ex post facto laws extended to civil matters,” specifically declaring that an 
express clause “provides that there shall be no ex post facto law.”283  Justice Iredell was not alone in 
contradicting himself once he became a Supreme Court Justice. As a circuit judge, in 1795, Judge 
William Paterson instructed a federal jury that the Constitution’s prohibition of state ex post facto 
laws extended to statutes disturbing land titles.284
Madison’s Notes on the Convention also support the flexible interpretation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause to include non-criminal matters.  In one instance, Rufus King of Massachusetts urged a 
contract clause to limit state power to violate private contracts.  After an objection, James Wilson of 
Pennsylvania replied: “The answer to these objections is that retrospective interferences only are to 
be prohibited.”285 According to Levy, since the debate centered on contract rights, Wilson’s remark 
indicated that ex post facto laws extended to civil, non-criminal matters.286 Madison inquired if that 
protection already existed: “Is that not already done by the prohibition of ex post facto laws, which 
will oblige the Judges to declare such interferences null & void.”287
Professor Levy cites several other historical examples of the common understanding of ex 
post facto laws,288 but one specific example serves to conclude with the argument that Calder needs 
to be either overruled or modified.  Two leading American heroes, George Mason and Patrick 
282Id. at 68-69.
283Id. at 69.
284Id.  After the Calder opinion, Congress debated the bankruptcy act, a purely civil matter.  
Opponents described the act as a prohibited ex post facto law.  The proponents declared it was not 
an ex post facto law.  “No one in the debates of 1799-1800 or 1803 stated the ex post facto laws 
did not apply to civil matters; and no one cited Calder.”  Id.  Yet today we cite it almost as a 
conditioned response that the Ex Post Facto Clause is limited to criminal cases.
285ORIGINAL INTENT 70.
286Id.
287Id. at 71.
288See id. at 65-74; see also id. at 126-28; 151-52; 413 n.76.
Henry, speaking against ratification during the Virginia ratifying convention, “opposed the ban on ex 
post facto laws precisely because those laws extended to civil matters.”289 However, an opponent of 
theirs, Edmund Pendleton, a ratificationist who presided over the Virginia ratifying convention, four 
years later declared in a judicial opinion that ex post facto laws “destroy rights already acquired 
under the former statute, by one made subsequent to the time when they were vested,” clearly 
indicating that Pendleton and his judicial brethren believed that ex post facto laws comprehended 
civil matters.290
Whether one looks to the original intent of the Framers, such as Madison, or the plain 
meaning, to principles and purposes derived from the Constitution, to history, and to precedents and 
conventional rules of construction, the final product should be the same.  Calder went too far in its 
declaration that the Ex Post Facto Clause includes only criminal cases.  The limited ruling is not 
supported by any of the methods of analysis traditionally utilized by jurists.  Professor Levy 
concludes his attack on Calder by stating:   “The Court in [Calder] reinvented the law on the 
subject.  In doing so the Court did not rely on original intent, and when it reconfirmed the basic 
doctrine of Calder in 1854 and claimed to be relying on original intent, it rested exclusively on 
Dickinson s remark; having found what it sought the Court ignored all else.”291
C. Post-Calder Supreme Court Decisions Support a Modification 
It is the humble opinion of this writer that the Calder principles are correct but only as the 
rules apply to criminal cases.  The Supreme Court, if faced with the issue in a case involving a 
retroactively imposed removal, should modify Calder to apply to quasi-punitive “civil” deportations 
289ORIGINAL INTENT 73.
290Id. (quoting Turner v. Turner’s Ex’x, 4 Call. (Va.) 234, 237 (1792)).  ORIGINAL INTENT 411.  
This decision, preceding Calder by six years, is a prime example of the understanding of the term 
ex post facto during the colonial era.
291ORIGINAL INTENT 74.  Levy refers to John Dickinson of Delaware who observed that on 
examining Blackstone’s Commentaries, he found that the term ex post facto related to criminal 
cases only.  Id. at 71.
based upon a pre-1996 Immigration Acts conviction.  Only then can we return, in part, to the 
standards of decency upon which our great nation was born.  Contrary to a large number of 
precedents that state that deportations are civil in nature and that Calder applies to criminal cases 
only, authorities exist to establish that the Ex Post Facto Clauses extend to civil settings.
For example, in Fletcher v. Peck292 and Ogden v. Saunders,293 the Court referred to the ex 
post facto prohibition against States as applying to civil as well as to criminal acts.294 Fletcher
involved the ex post facto issue in the context of a contract involving land.  Chief Justice Marshall, 
writing for a unanimous court, rationalized that since the estate passed into the hands of a purchaser 
for valuable consideration, without notice, the state of Georgia was restrained by either general 
principles of law or by the United States Constitution from passing a law whereby the estate could 
be impaired and rendered null and void.295  The Court stated that an ex post facto law may inflict 
penalties on the person or it may inflict pecuniary penalties that swell the public treasury.296  “The 
legislature is then prohibited from passing a law by which a man’s estate . . . shall be seized for a 
crime which was not declared, by some previous law, to render him liable to that punishment.”297
In Ogden Justice Johnson initiated his crusade against the ex post facto dictum found in 
Calder.  “It is true, that some confusion has arisen from an opinion, which seems early, and without 
due examination, to have found its way into this Court; that the phrase “ex post facto,” was confined 
292
 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 138 (1810).
293
 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827).
294A more modern discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause and its application to civil matters
occurred in Hiss v. Hampton, 338 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1972).  In the 1950s Alger Hiss was 
convicted of perjury in connection with issues dealing with national security.  Upon reports that he 
would receive his federal pension a few years later, Congress enacted the Hiss Act, a law which 
denied him his pension.  The House debate included comments that the pension denial would be 
penal and not regulatory.  Id. at 1153. 
295
 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 138 (1810).
296 Id.
297 Id.
to laws affecting criminal acts alone.”298  Two years later, Justice Johnson made his last effort to 
correct his perceived wrongs of Calder.  In Satterlee v. Mathewson,299 he repeated his concerns with 
the “unhappy idea” that the phrase ex post facto would be limited to criminal cases only, “a decision 
which leaves a large class of arbitrary legislative acts without the prohibitions of the constitution.”300
 He went even further by appending to the Satterlee opinion a note on the exposition of the phrase 
“ex post facto” in the Constitution.301  First, Calder could have been decided on more narrow 
grounds without having to expound on the ex post facto issue; the acts of the Connecticut legislature 
amounted to the exercise of judicial, not legislative, authority, and thus, by definition, not reachable 
under the Ex Post Facto Clause.302  Second, the adjudication in Calder amounted to obiter dictum 
since the law or act complained of had nothing to do with criminal law.303
Extending the appropriate courtesies to his learned brethren in Calder, Justice Johnson 
proceeds to establish that they have not proved that the term ex post facto is limited to criminal 
cases.
304
  To best prove that civil cases came within the ex post facto concept, he refers to a 
precedent from the year 1720, involving a contract and a later enacted statute.  The court there 
stated:  “This act being ex post facto, the construction of the words ought not to be strained, in order 
to defeat a contract, to the benefit whereof the party was well entitled, at the time the contract was 
made.”305  Three points support Justice Johnson’s position:  First, the courts used the term ex post 
facto “in a sense equally applicable to contracts and to crimes; second, the courts applied it to 
298
 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827).
299
 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829).
300 Id. at 416.  Justice Johnson prepared an appendix to this opinion in which he sets forth a 
linguistic and legal history of the term ex post facto.  See 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 681-87.
301Id. at 681-87.
302 Id. at 682.  The Connecticut legislature historically engaged in judicial activities such as 
granting new trials.  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395 (1798).
303 Id. at 683 (“An opinion given in court, if not necessary to the judgment given of record, is . . . 
no judicial opinion at all, and consequently no precedent. . . .”).
304 Id.
305 Id. at 684 (quoting Wilkinson v. Meyer, 2 Lord Raym. 1350-52). 
statutes affecting contracts; and third, as late as the time of Lord Raymond, the term had not received 
a practical or technical construction which restricted it to criminal cases.”306  If the Ex Post Facto 
Clause applies to assets, as Fletcher discusses, then it undoubtedly should apply to the liberty of a 
permanent resident alien who has been additionally punished by removal for a previously committed 
crime.  
When Wooddeson, a noted scholar, wrote about the subject, he referred to “all penal statutes 
passed ex post facto.”307  Johnson questions “but why say penal statutes, and not simply statutes 
passed ex post facto, if the use of the phrase was exclusively limited to penal statutes.”308
Additionally, he cites other sources that state “if a contract be not in its inception usurious, no matter 
ex post facto shall make it so.”309  In a final rebuttal to the Calder jurists, Justice Johnson notes:
But with all deference, I must contend that if any thing is to be deduced from the 
arrangement of the three instances of restriction, the argument will be against [Justice 
Paterson].  For by placing “ex post facto laws” between bills of attainder, which are 
exclusively criminal, and laws violating the obligation of contracts which are 
exclusively civil, it would rather seem that ex post facto laws partook of both 
characters, was common to both purposes.310
Simply stated, “the case of Calder vs. Bull cannot claim the pre-eminence of an adjudged case upon 
this point, and if adjudged was certainly not sustained by reason of authorities.”311  Subsequent 
Supreme Court opinions nonetheless adhere to the Calder dictum.312
Not all was lost in the effort to broaden the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause.  In 
Cummings v. Missouri,313 the Court addressed a question regarding the state’s practice in its post-
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id. (emphasis in original).
309 Id. at 686 (quoting 1 SHEPPARD’S TOUCHSTONE 63) (emphasis in original).
310 Id. at 687.
311 Id.
312 E.g., Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456, 463-64 (1854).
31371 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 278-79, 317 (1866).
bellum constitution of restricting the civil rights of individuals who had previously engaged in armed 
hostility to the United States, particularly requiring priests and clergymen to take and subscribe an 
oath that they had not committed certain designated acts.  In a companion case, Ex parte Garland,314
the Court voided an 1865 act of Congress which provided that no person shall be admitted as an 
attorney and counselor to the bar of the Supreme Court and to the bars of any other circuit or district 
courts of the United States unless he shall have first taken and subscribed the oath that he has never 
voluntarily borne arms against the United States.  The Court ruled that such oaths respectively 
imposed punishments.315
The Court in Cummings criticizes the counsel for the state of Missouri for minimizing the 
scope of the term “punishment” by limiting it to only a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. The 
majority opinion states:  
The disabilities created by the constitution of Missouri must be regarded as 
penalties--they constitute punishment. . . .The learned counsel . . .  does not 
include under liberty freedom from outrage on the feelings as well as 
restraints on the person.  He does not include under such property those 
estates which one may acquire in professions. . . . The deprivation of any 
rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment. . . . 
Disqualification from office may be punishment, as in cases of conviction 
upon impeachment.316
The Court further cites Blackstone who claims that some punishments consist of “exile or 
banishment, by abjuration of the realm or transportation; others in loss of liberty by perpetual or 
temporary imprisonment.”317  If Blackstone is good authority for the alleged claim that ex post facto 
laws relate only to criminal matters, with which the writer vehemently disagrees, then there should 
314 Id. at 333, 347.
315 Id. at 320, 333, 347.
316Id. at 320 (emphasis added) (compare this disqualification from office to a disqualification from 
continued residence in or removal from the United States on the basis of conviction for an alleged 
aggravated felony).
317 Id. at 321.
be no quarrel with Blackstone’s claim that exile and banishment, i.e., removal, constitute 
punishment.  If so, then the writer’s position that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to deportations 
and removals, modern-day exiles and banishments, should be accepted without further debate.
The language involving bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, according to Chief Justice 
Marshall, contains perhaps the closest protection in the nature of a bill of rights for the people of the 
various states.318  The Court in Cummings discusses the little-known concept of a bill of attainder, 
describing it as a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.319  In those cases the 
legislative body exercises the powers and office of a judge by pronouncing upon the guilt of the 
party, without any of the safeguards of a trial; it determines the sufficiency of the required proof; and 
it fixes the punishment in accordance with its own notions of the enormity of the offense.320  One 
specific historical example of a bill of attainder involves the Earl of Clarendon.  A bill entered 
against the earl provided that he should suffer perpetual exile, i.e., forever banished, from the 
realm.321
318 See id. at 325.  The Constitutional Convention adopted the Constitution in Philadelphia in 
September 1787 and ratified it on July 2, 1788. The section known today as The Bill of Rights, 
amendments one through ten, was ratified in December 1791.  CENTER FOR CIVIC EDUCATION, 
AMERICAN LEGACY:  THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 12, 27-28 (1998).
31971 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866) (compare the bill of attainder definition to the statutory 
provisions of the 1996 Immigration Acts that call for removal of any alien convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time, whether before, on, or after the effective date of the law). The 
dissenting opinion in Ex parte Garland limits bills of attainder to those which involve a capitally 
condemned person whose inheritance suffered the stain or corruption of blood. See Cummings, 71 
U.S. at 333, 387.
320 Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323.  The Court further quotes Justice Story in his Commentaries, § 
1344, who explains that bills of attainder are generally enacted in times of “violent political 
excitements,” trampling the rights and liberties of others. Id. (compare the post-war actions in 
Cummings and Ex parte Garland to the atmosphere after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
and the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building as they contributed to the 1996 
anti-terrorist legislative emotional intensity on Capitol Hill and now the aftermath of the Twin 
Tower Tragedy).
321Cummings, 71 U.S. at 324 (if the earl were to be found in England or any of the king’s 
dominions after the first of February 1667, he should suffer the pains and penalties of treason).
In Cummings, the Court concludes that the actions of the state legislature took aim at past, 
not future, acts that did not define any crimes or declare that any punishment shall be inflicted.322
However, the state provisions were intended to deprive such persons of the right to hold certain 
offices and trusts, and to pursue their ordinary and regular avocations.323  In its final holding, the 
Court stated: 
This deprivation is punishment; nor is it any less so because a 
way is opened for escape from it by the expurgatory oath. . . .To make 
the enjoyment of a right dependent upon an impossible condition is 
equivalent to an absolute denial of the right under any condition, and 
such denial, enforced for a past act, is nothing less than punishment 
imposed for the act.324
VIII. Stogner v. California: The Death Knell for Punitive Deportations? 
A. Stogner:  The Supreme Court Re-Visits the Ex Post Facto Clause
In Stogner v. California325 the United States Supreme Court encountered a sensitive issue, 
i.e., adjudication of the constitutional rights of an accused child molester.  Justice Breyer, writing for 
the majority, concluded that a California statute enacted after pre-existing limitations periods had 
expired and which resurrected otherwise time-barred criminal prosecutions violated the 
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.326  California allowed prosecution for sex-related child abuse if 
the prosecution began within one year of a victim's report to police.  A subsequent provision 
clarified that this law revived causes of action barred by prior limitations statutes. In 1998 Stogner 
was indicted for sex-related child abuse committed between 1955 and 1973. At the time those 
322 Id. at 327.
323 Id.
324Id. (emphasis added).
325539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).  Justice Breyer was joined in the majority opinion by 
Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens.  Id. at 2448.
crimes were allegedly committed, the limitations period was three years. The Court held that the new 
California statute of limitations law produces the kind of retroactivity that the Constitution forbids. 
First, the law threatens the kinds of harm that the Clause seeks to avoid, since the Clause bars 
governments from enacting statutes with “manifestly unjust and oppressive” retroactive effects.327
Second, the law falls literally within the categorical descriptions of ex post facto laws that Justice 
Chase set forth authoritatively more than 200 years ago in Calder.  It falls within the second 
category, which Justice Chase understood to include a new law that inflicts punishments where the 
party was not, by law, liable to any punishment.328
Justice Breyer described the impact of the changes in the statute of limitations by saying the 
government has refused “to play by its own rules”329 and has deprived the defendant of the “fair 
warning”330 that might have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence. Allowing legislatures to 
decide when to enact retroactive laws, he added, risks both “arbitrary and potentially vindictive 
legislation” and erosion of the separation of powers.331 Drawing substantially on Richard 
Wooddeson's 18th-century commentary on the nature of ex post facto laws, the majority recounts the 
four factors that Justice Chase enumerated in Calder:   
326Id. at 2448, 2449.
327Id.
328Id. at 2450-51; see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990).
329Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2450 (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000)). 
330Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)).
331Id., quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29; see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 
(1810) (viewing the Ex Post Facto Clause as a protection against “violent acts which might grow 
out of the feelings of the moment”). 
I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words 
and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action 
done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when 
done, criminal; and punishes such action.  2d. Every law that 
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater 
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.   
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives 
less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the 
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. All these, 
and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.332
The Court found the second category--including any “law that aggravates a crime, or makes 
it greater than it was, when committed”--describes California’s statute as long as those words are 
understood as Justice Chase understood them, i.e., as referring to a statute that “inflicts punishments, 
where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment.”333 After all, the statute of limitations had 
expired.  Justice Breyer further found historical support in the writings of R. Wooddeson who 
discusses the ex post facto status of a law that affects punishment by “making therein some 
innovation, or creating some forfeiture or disability, not incurred in the ordinary course of law.”334
He cites as an example of such a law the Acts of Parliament that banished certain individuals 
accused of treason, a fact significant because Parliament had enacted those laws not only after the 
crime’s commission but also under circumstances where banishment “was simply not a form of 
penalty that could be imposed by the courts.”335
332Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2450 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 390-91 (emphasis added to 
portion relevant to application to the 1996 Immigration Acts).
333Id.
334Id. at 2451 (emphasis in original) (quoting 2 R. WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 638 (1792).
335Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2451.
The majority opinion takes the offensive against the dissent, accusing them of undertaking a 
Herculean effort to prove that it is not unfair, in any constitutionally relevant sense, to prosecute a 
man for crimes committed twenty-five to forty-two years earlier when nearly a generation has passed 
since the law granted him an effective amnesty.336 According to the majority, the dissent interprets 
Justice Chase’s historical examples to show that Calder’s second category concerns only laws that 
both (1) subject the offender to increased punishment and (2) do so by changing the nature of an 
offense to make it greater than it was at the time of commission.337
Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissent, says it is a fallacy to apply the label “unfair and 
dishonest” to the statute, even though the law revives long-dead prosecutions.338  A law that does not 
alter the definition of the crime but only revives prosecution does not make the crime “greater than it 
was, when committed.”  He further argued that until Stogner, a plea in bar had not been thought to 
form any part of the definition of an offense.339 The dissent additionally asserts that the reach of the 
Ex Post Facto Clause is strictly limited to the precise formulation of the Calder categories.  The first 
three categories guard against the common problem of retroactive redefinition of conduct by 
criminalizing it (category one), enhancing its criminal character  (category two), or increasing the 
applicable punishment (category three).340  Citing from Calder, Justice Kennedy repeats:  “The 
enhancement of a crime, or penalty, seems to come within the same mischief as the creation of a 
crime or penalty; and therefore they may be classed together.”341
336Id. at 2455.
337Id. 
338See id. at 2463.  Justice Kennedy was joined in the dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas.  Id. at 2461.
339See id. at 2464.
340Id. 
341Id. at 2465 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 397).
The dissent noted that it was an accepted procedure in 17th-century England for Parliament 
to pass laws imposing banishment.  In order to counter the majority, the dissent discussed the 
examples of Clarendon and Bishop Francis Atterbury, who, in the midst of hysteria over both real 
and supposed plots, was accused of conspiracy to depose George I.  The evidence against Atterbury 
was meager, and supporters of the Crown, fearing neither the common-law courts nor even the 
House of Lords would convict, introduced a bill of banishment, declaring Atterbury a traitor and 
subjecting him to a range of punishments not previously imposed, including exile and civil death.342
 The Duke of Wharton, who registered the lengthiest dissent, commented that “[Atterbury’s] Bill 
seems as irregular in the punishments it inflicts, as it is in its foundation, and carries with it an 
unnatural degree of hardship,” adding that the sanction against Clarendon, although more mild, was 
just as violative of the rule against penalties imposed after the fact.343  According to the dissent, 
these illustrative examples suggest the second Calder category encompasses only the laws that, to the 
detriment of the defendant, change the character of the offense to make it greater than it was at the 
time of commission.344
342Id. at 2468, citing G. BENNETT, TORY CRISIS IN CHURCH AND STATE, 1688-1730, at 258-65 
(1975); BISHOP ATTERBURY’S TRIAL, 16 How. St. Tr. 323, 640, 644-46 (1723) (reprint 2000).
343Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2469.
344Id. (emphasis added).  Based on his perspectives as a former trial judge in criminal matters, the 
writer agrees with the dissent on the need to consider the age and other characteristics of the 
victims in the enactment of an appropriate statute of limitations.  However, such factors cannot 
justify the dissent’s abandonment of constitutional protections against Ex Post Facto legislation. 
Justice Kennedy approvingly states that the link between these three categories was noted by 
Justice Paterson in Calder: “The enhancement of a crime, or penalty, seems to come within the same 
mischief as the creation of a crime or penalty; and therefore they may be classed together.”345
Finally, the dissent cites an expert’s treatise on the Ex Post Facto Clause, stating that the category of 
retroactive legislation covered:
[T]he law which undertakes to  aggravate a past offence, and 
make it greater than when committed, endeavors to bring it under 
some description of transgression against which heavier penalties or 
more severe punishments have been denounced: as, changing the 
character of an act which, when committed, was a misdemeanor, to a 
crime; or, declaring a previously committed offence, of one of the 
classes graduated, and designated by the number of its degree, to be 
of a higher degree than it was when committed.346
The federal law, seen as supreme in matters involving immigration matters, clearly impacted state 
misdemeanors by graduating them to “a higher degree than it was when committed.” Stated another 
way, Congress converted scores of state misdemeanors across the nation into “aggravated felonies” 
and, even worse, increased the punishment by adding removal, modern-day banishment, as a further 
consequence of the conviction.  The federal courts should thus apply the Stogner ex post facto 
interpretation and void punitive removals that are based on retroactive criminal convictions.
345Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2465 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 397).
346Id. at 2464 (quoting WILLIAM WADE, OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF RETROACTIVE
LAWS § 273, at 317-18 (1880)). 
Stogner is not the only shining light that the Supreme Court has emitted in potential efforts to 
undo injustices created by the 1996 Immigration Acts.   Earlier in the same term the Court decided 
Smith v. Doe,347 a case challenging a sex offender registration act as an unconstitutional ex post facto
law.  The Alaska statute at issue in Smith v. Doe required any sex offender or child kidnapper to 
register either with a prison system, if they are incarcerated, or with local law enforcement if the 
individual is at liberty.  Both the registration and the notification system are retroactive.348  The law 
mandated registration for 15 years if convicted only once and for life if convicted of an aggravated 
sex offense or of two or more sex offenses.349  The respondents in Smith v. Doe were each convicted 
of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor and were each released in 1990 from prison.  John Doe I and 
John Doe II claimed that the even if the legislature intended the act to be a non-punitive, civil 
regulatory scheme, as applied to them it constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.350  The Court held that the Alaska statute established a civil regulatory scheme, one 
whose retroactive application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.351
347538 U.S. 84 (2003).
348Id. at 90.
349Id.
350See id. at 91-92.
351Id. at 105-06.
In considering whether a law constitutes retroactive punishment, the Court must first 
“ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.”352  If the 
intention of the legislature, or the Congress in the case of the 1996 Immigration Acts, was to impose 
punishment, that ends the inquiry.   On the other hand, if the intention was to enact a regulatory 
scheme that is civil and non-punitive, the inquiry proceeds to examine whether the statutory scheme 
is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the Government’s intention to have a purely 
civil system.353  Even if the statute’s objective is consistent with the purposes of the Alaska criminal 
justice system, Alaska’s regulatory scheme, i.e., registration and notification, does not make the 
objective punitive.354  Further, where a legislative act is related to the state’s power to protect the 
health and safety of its citizens, it will be considered regulatory and not a purpose to add to the 
punishment.355
B. The Punitive Aspects of the Aggravated Felony Legislation
One only need look objectively at the 1996 Immigration Acts to conclude that Congress 
intended the enactment of punitive legislation.  Legislative history might be helpful but hardly 
essential to establish intent where Congress so blatantly set out to create a new scheme to fight 
terrorism and the infiltration of aliens into American society.356  Congress first utilized the 
“aggravated felony” concept in the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.357  Congress next 
addressed the term in the 1996 enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996358 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.359
 What better proof of intent to enact punitive laws than by the title of the two more recent pieces of 
legislation.  
352Id. at 92 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
353Id.; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
354Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 94.
355Id. at 93-94 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960)).
356A Harvard University professor, Samuel P. Huntington, documents some of our nation’s 
xenophobic concerns in an excerpt from his book WHO WE ARE in which he discusses an alleged 
In addition to the obvious intent, the 1996 Immigration Acts further concentrated on a new 
penalty classification scheme with removal consequences.  The Acts further defined the term 
“aggravated felony,” which, for example, now includes convictions for theft or burglary if the alien 
receives a term of imprisonment of at least a year.360 The amendment further includes convictions 
for fraud and deceit where the victim lost over $10,000.361  The congressional intent was so punitive 
that on September 30, 1996, the effective date of the second Immigration Act, a resident alien’s pre-
1996 conviction legislatively transformed from a misdemeanor into an “aggravated felony.”362
Congress also expanded the term aggravated felony to include any “crime of violence”363 resulting in 
a prison sentence of at least one year.364
Hispanic challenge.   Huntington warns of the need for immigrants of Mexican descent to become 
Americanized and of the fears that these immigrants from Mexico and Latin America will make 
the United States a divided bilingual, bicultural nation.  John Hall, Noted professor sounds the 
alarm on immigration, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, March 7, 2004 (page unknown), available at 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=67ddf96e9574b219da690f2d62d76a2d&docn
357102 Stat. 4469-70 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (2000). 
358Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
359Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-46 (1996).
360Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (G) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.).
361Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (M)(i) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.).
362Maynard, supra note 3, at 29; INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (2000).  Appellate courts have 
held that misdemeanor shoplifting convictions with a one-year suspended sentence or potential 
sentence amount to aggravated felonies.  E.g., United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 153 (2d 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 791-92 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845 
(1999).
36318 U.S.C. § 16 (1994 ed., Supp. V); INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (2000).
364Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (F) (1994 ed., Supp. V) with (1994 ed.).  Apparently, an 
actually served sentence of 364 days in jail custody does not meet the one-year requirement. See
Maynard 28.  See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 16 (a), (b) (2000).  The question whether a drunk 
driving case that results in injury constitutes a crime of violence should be answered by the 
Supreme Court within the year.  See Leocal v. Ashcroft (unpublished) (11th Cir. 2003), cert. 
granted, --U.S.--, 124 S. Ct. 1405 (2004); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (h) (3) (injury resulting to 
another from driving while intoxicated constitutes a “serious criminal offense”).
A further view of Smith v. Doe corroborates the writer’s argument that the 1996 Immigration 
Acts qualify as strictly punitive statutes for Ex Post Facto Clause analysis.  The Court discusses the 
fact that a state that seeks to punish an individual will likely select a means that is traditionally 
considered punitive, proceeding to conclude that sex offender registration and notification statutes 
do not meet that punitive level.365  The sex offenders in Smith v. Doe argued that they were being 
subjected to shaming punishments of the colonial period, but the Court concluded that the state does 
not make the publicity and the resulting stigma “an integral part of the objective of the regulatory 
scheme.”366
365Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
366Id. at 97, 99.
Of particular interest is the Court’s treatment of the history of other colonial era 
punishments.  The Court recognized that certain colonial practices were designed to make these 
offenders suffer “permanent stigmas, which in effect cast the person out of the community.”367  The 
Court continued, “The most serious offenders were banished, after which they could neither return to 
their original community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted easily into a new one.”368  In 
addition to the dissemination of information to society in early punitive practices, the Court noted 
that banishment particularly carried more than the normal: It meant expulsion from the 
community.369  In upholding Alaska’s statutory scheme, the Court observed: “In contrast to the 
colonial shaming punishments, however, the State does not make the publicity and the resulting 
stigma an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.”370  On the other hand, Congress, in 
passing the 1996 Immigration Acts, acted to make removal, a euphemistically-labeled banishment, 
“an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.”  In doing this, Congress created a 
punitive system that must overcome ex post facto and due process of law challenges.
367Id. at 98 (quoting Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1880, 1913 (1991)).
368Id. (quoting T. BLOMBERG & K. LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A HISTORY OF CONTROL
30-31 (2000)).
369Id. 
370Id. at 99.
C. Application of Stogner to the Removal Aspects of the 1996 Legislation  
Justice Breyer described the impact of the changes in the statute of limitations by saying the 
government has refused “to play by its own rules”371 and has deprived the defendant of the “fair 
warning”372 that might have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence.   Allowing legislatures to 
decide when to enact retroactive laws, he added, risks both “arbitrary and potentially vindictive 
legislation” and erosion of the separation of powers.373  Similarly, the 1996 Immigration Acts place 
the resident alien in the predicament of making knowing, voluntary and intelligent decisions on 
whether or not to waive valuable constitutional rights in a vacuum.  Making a decision on whether or 
not to abandon a right to a jury trial, or to contest questionably-obtained evidence, is sufficiently 
troubling.  Now the Congress and the courts in incredibly large numbers are requiring removals of 
aliens who waived rights to contest the quantum of evidence and the legality of searches in the 
honest and legitimate, at the time, belief that the offense was not a deportable offense.
Justice Breyer refers to the ex post facto status of a law that affects punishment by “making 
therein some innovation, or creating some forfeiture or disability, not incurred in the ordinary 
course of law.”374  The ordinary course of the criminal law in 1980, for example, was whatever the 
penal statute provided as punishment.  Adding removal, modern-day banishment, to the 
consequences of a criminal conviction more than a decade after the finality of the conviction clearly 
constitutes a forfeiture or disability not incurred in the regular course of the law.
371539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2450  (2003) (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 
(2000)).
372Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)).
373Id. (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29); see also  Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-
138 (1810) (The Ex Post Facto Clause seen as a protection against “violent acts which might grow 
out of the feelings of the moment”). 
374Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2451 (quoting 2 R. WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL
VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 638 (1792)) (emphasis from original opinion).
The writer’s thesis, that deportations for criminal conduct engaged in at any time before the 
effective date of the new statute, in this case the 1996 Immigration Acts, violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, is supported by both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Stogner.  For instance, both 
opinions refer to the historical practice of banishment as punishment.  Can one really dispute that 
banishment is deportation, exile, removal?  The writer does not seek to bar all removals; instead, the 
writer seeks to restrict the power of Congress from retroactively imposing removals for criminal 
convictions finalized prior to the effective date of the 1996 Immigration Acts and as to additional 
retroactive efforts in future legislation.  Further support for the writer’s position surfaces in the 
following passage of the majority opinion:
 In sum, Clarendon's case involved Parliament’s punishment of an individual 
who was charged before Parliament with treason and satisfactorily proven to have 
committed treason, but whom Parliament punished by imposing “banishment” in 
circumstances where the party was not, in “the ordinary course of law,” liable to any 
“banishment” . . . To repeat, the example of Clarendon’s banishment is an example 
of an individual’s being punished through legislation that subjected him to 
punishment otherwise unavailable, to any degree, through “the ordinary course of 
law. . . .”375
375Id. at 2456; see also Carmell, 529 U.S. at 523, n. 11.  With respect to the second category, 
Justice Chase provided two examples: the banishments of Lord Clarendon in 1667 and of Bishop 
Francis Atterbury in 1723.  Id. at 2467.  Banishment is acknowledged as a punishment.  id.; see 
also, Craies, Compulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm, 6 L.Q. REV. 388, 392 (1890) (Both 
perpetual and temporary banishment were well known to the common law) (Cited by Justice 
Kennedy in his dissent, Stogner, 539 U.S. 607, 123 S. Ct. at 2467 ).
D. A Historical Precedence for Ex Post Facto Assessment of a Civil Statute
In Hiss v. Hampton376 a federal employee named Alger Hiss accumulated fifteen years of 
federal employment service between 1929 and 1947.  Hiss was convicted in 1950 of perjury before a 
Federal grand jury and sentenced to five years.377 When he reached the age of 62 in 1966, he became 
eligible for a federal monthly annuity.  In 1967 Hiss filed a claim for his annuity.  The Civil Service 
Commission rejected his application pursuant to section 1 (a) (3) (B) of Public Law 87-299.378 That 
section, retroactively applied to Hiss, provided:
(a) An individual . . . may not be paid annuity or retired pay . . . if the individual--
(1) was convicted, before, on, or after September 1, 1954 of . . .
(b) . . . (3)  Perjury committed under the statutes of the United States or the District of 
Columbia” 
(B) in testifying before a Federal grand jury . . . in connection with a matter involving or 
relating to an interference with or endangerment of . . . the national security or 
defense of the United States.379
376338 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1972).
377Id. at 1144.
378Id. at 1143.  The statute is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8312 (1996).
379338 F. Supp. at 1144 (emphasis added).
The district court faced the issue whether the imposed disabilities were effectively punitive 
even though the denial of the pension was based upon a civil statute.  The court stated that the 
disabilities imposed by the statute could not be applied to Hiss because of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.380  The court appears to center its decision on the fact that the civil disability was contingent 
upon the criminal conviction he suffered in 1950, eleven years before the enactment of the law.381
The district court declared that as applied to Hiss and his co-defendant Strasburger, the retroactive 
statute “does not regulate, it punishes” since other violent and morally corrupt former federal 
employees were restored to grace and not denied benefits.382
IX. Conclusion
380Id. at 1153.
381Id. at 1148.    The 1996 Immigration Acts repeat this history and base a removal, in part, upon 
conviction for an aggravated felony.
382Id. at 1153.
Our American jurisprudence has seen antiquated rulings set aside to make room for our ever-
evolving sense of fairness.383  This great nation should not succumb to the concerns expressed by the 
patriot Thomas Paine who stated: “A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it a superficial 
appearance of being right.”384  In addition, we should always ask ourselves, regardless of our 
partisan politics, the words of Robert F. Kennedy, the words with which this article began.  We 
should not just complain about injustices we see around us.  We should utilize our God-given 
intellectual powers and debate issues that concern America and possibly attain a resolution.  
Specifically, we may never find an adequate answer to the human suffering that results from the 
migration of undocumented workers.  However, we should address the issues regarding when, how 
and why a United States permanent resident alien has to vacate his American home other than just 
by the issuance of an absolute legislative edict.  Where is the third branch of government in this 
process?  Two hundred years ago, Chief Justice John Marshall delivered his decision in Marbury v. 
Madison.  As enunciated in Marbury, the third branch has to revive its historical mission of tackling 
those statutes that are repugnant to the Constitution.385
383E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 
(1942); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and 
its exclusionary rule limitations.
384Guy N. Harrison, Who Guarantees These Rights?, 65 TEX. B.J. 794 (2002).
385See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
As a nation the United States necessarily accepted undocumented immigrant labor, primarily 
Latinos from Mexico.  Enticed by the opportunities, Latinos and others have continued to migrate, 
both legally and illegally.  The fact that a number of immigrants have violated the law during their 
United States residence does not justify this nation’s policy, as reflected in the 1996 Immigration 
Acts, of disregarding the Constitution and curtailing rights of resident aliens by retroactively 
punishing them for criminal convictions obtained years before 1996.  Without question, the 
Constitution places in the Congress ultimate control over immigration issues.  However, the 
Constitution places in the three branches of government the duty to respect the overall spirit of our 
fundamental document and to accord due process protections to all, even to those who are not yet 
citizens of the United States.  The Founding Fathers essentially sent this message when they avoided 
any mention of “citizens” in promulgating the Bill of Rights, and Congress continued this 
constitutional doctrine in distinguishing between rights of citizens and the rights of all persons in 
drafting later amendments.386
In conclusion, the writer urges the United States Supreme Court to extend the Ex Post Facto 
Clause to quasi-punitive deportation proceedings, i.e., those in which the removal order resulted 
from a pre-1996 conviction.  Our Constitution has developed over the years into a document that 
flexibly adjusts to the changing times.  The thousands of American residents who face removal or 
have been removed from their adopted country and from their families for conduct preceding the 
1996 Act should receive relief.  Those who have already suffered separation from their home and 
family should be re-evaluated for return to the United States. 
386E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws”); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (involving the rights of citizens to vote).
The writer hopes he has shown and explained how retroactive statutes, albeit partially civil in 
nature, can have such punitive consequences that they should be constitutionally prohibited.   The 
1996 IIRIRA legislation represents one of those statutes that, in specific circumstances, has not only 
a retroactive reach but also a punitive impact. The writer further contends that removal, when 
conditioned upon a prior conviction, results in a loss of liberty that triggers not only due process 
protections but also ex post facto prohibitions. 
The 1996 Immigration Acts must be amended.  Cases that reach the courts must be accorded 
a constitutional rule consistent with American and constitutional history.  Judicial precedents have 
been reversed in the past.  Judicial precedents will be reversed in the future.  The amelioration of 
immense suffering in families throughout America will result once this part of our history will be 
corrected and the regressive and punitive impact of the 1996 Immigration Acts will be eliminated.  
Remembering the words of Anthony Lewis, a prominent columnist for the New York Times, who 
called for reform of the 1996 Act, we as a great people need to return to the concepts of American 
decency.  Proud Americans and the immigrant community petition the nation’s Supreme Court to 
cut through the ideological barriers and exercise their power as the third branch of government by 
correcting--retroactively--the multitude of wrongs which have occurred since the passage of the 
AEDPA and IIRIRA, the 1996 Immigration Acts. 
